# \*\*\*\*NATO FOCUS DA: GDI22 Packet\*\*\*\*

# Topshelf

### NATO Focus DA: 1NC

#### A—Unique link – NATO adaption required now – narrowly focusing alliance tasks necessary to check China threat

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 193]

NATO’s continued transformation in the coming years seems all but certain; less certain is what it will transform into. The alliance has survived this long by adapting. But unlike during previous rounds of adaptation that involved the alliance taking on more responsibilities and tasks, the coming decades—whose defining feature will be the continued rise of China—will require a much more narrowly focused alliance. For nigh on three decades, NATO had the luxury of pondering what kind of alliance it wanted to be as it searched for a new raison d’etre in the reduced threat environment following the end of the Cold War. But the contrast between the 1990s and today’s deluge of challenges and threats is stark, and NATO no longer has the luxury of time.

To ensure the alliance’s future operational utility, the alliance must embrace its original collective defense identity and look for ways to streamline, and where possible reduce, its existing collective security and crisis management activities. In addition to offloading existing responsibilities to the EU and UN, NATO should think twice before taking on new mandates and avoid elevating new tasks like resiliency or counterterrorism missions and assigning them equal importance to Article 5. The alternative to the vision outlined here is an alliance increasingly weighed down by a myriad of tasks, unable to prioritize among them, and lacking both the political will and financial resources to perform its main function. An overburdened NATO risks being unable to fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense, thereby increasing the risk of further fracturing within the alliance. The proposed course of action will by no means be an easy one. But it provides the best chance to guarantee that the transatlantic alliance will have the capabilities and assets needed to meet the challenges posed by China’s rise.

#### B—Failure to adapt risks escalatory wars with China—alliances are critical

Beckley, Tufts professor and Brands, Johns Hopkins professor, ‘21

[Michael Beckley, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Associate Professor, Tufts University and Hal Brands, Senior Fellow, American Enterpreise Institute and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “What Will Drive China to War?” THE ATLANTIC, 11—1—21, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/us-china-war/620571/>, accessed 6-12-22]

Get ready for the “terrible 2020s”: a period in which China has strong incentives to grab “lost” land and break up coalitions seeking to check its advance. Beijing possesses grandiose territorial aims as well as a strategic culture that emphasizes hitting first and hitting hard when it perceives gathering dangers. It has a host of wasting assets in the form of military advantages that may not endure beyond this decade. Such dynamics have driven China to war in the past and could do so again today.

If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.

The U.S. and its friends can take steps to deter the PRC, such as drastically speeding the acquisition of weaponry and prepositioning military assets in the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas, among other efforts, to showcase its hard power and ensure that China can’t easily knock out U.S. combat power in a surprise attack. At the same time, calmly firming up multilateral plans, involving Japan, Australia, and potentially India and Britain, for responding to Chinese aggression could make Beijing realize how costly such aggression might be. If Beijing understands that it cannot easily or cheaply win a conflict, it may be more cautious about starting one.

Most of these steps are not technologically difficult: They exploit capabilities that are available today. Yet they require an intellectual shift—a realization that the United States and its allies need to rapidly shut China’s windows of military opportunity, which means preparing for a war that could well start in 2025 rather than in 2035. And that, in turn, requires a degree of political will and urgency that has so far been lacking.

China’s historical warning signs are already flashing red. Indeed, taking the long view of why and under which circumstances China fights is the key to understanding just how short time has become for America and the other countries in Beijing’s path.

### NATO Focus DA: Turns Case—2NC

#### NATO’s effectiveness depends on prioritization—must resist temptation to “do everything”

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistnat Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better.

#### NATO effectiveness depends on its ability to focus

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more.

Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address.

# Uniqueness [7.8K]

### Uniq: China Focus

#### Biden is pushing NATO to focus on China

Brands, Johns Hopkins professor, ‘22

[Hal Brands, Senior Fellow, American Enterpreise Institute and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “The Overstretched Superpower,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1—18—22, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower?check_logged_in=1>, accessed 6-12-22]

Biden is undoubtedly right that the Chinese challenge overshadows all others, despite unresolved debates in Washington over exactly when that challenge will become most severe. His administration has made major moves in the Sino-American competition during its first year—expanding multilateral military planning and exercises in the western Pacific, focusing bodies such as NATO and the G-7 on Beijing’s belligerence, and launching the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. Yet Biden hasn’t enjoyed anything resembling a respite on other fronts.

#### NATO focused on China – new strategic concept proves

Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, and, Smith, US ambassador to NATO, ‘22

[Dan and Julie, NATO's New Momentum A Conversation With U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith, Foreign Affairs June 9 2022 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum accessed 6/15/22](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum%20accessed%206/15/22) GDI-TM]

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So looking ahead to the Madrid summit in late June, presumably Finland and Sweden will be one big piece of business that you all will focus on—but so will the unveiling of a new strategic concept. If we looked back a year ago, the conversation about NATO was what role it would play in U.S. competition with China. And you wrote a great piece for Foreign Affairs with Torrey Tausig a couple of years ago called “The Old World and the Middle Kingdom” about what role Europe and the transatlantic alliance should play in competition with China broadly. To what extent does NATO have any capacity or any real role when it comes to what is probably still the major security competition of our time and the biggest geopolitical challenge for the United States, and that’s China?

JULIE SMITH

Well, there’s some good news here, and that is that for the first time in its history, in 2019 NATO conducted a China review where it stepped back and tried to better understand how China can challenge the security of the alliance and the degree to which NATO should turn its attention to China, both just in itself as a competitor a systemic rival—but also how NATO should cope with China’s increasing activities and presence in the Euro-Atlantic area. And so that was step one. Step two in terms of a turning point for the alliance was the language that you saw in the communiqué that came out of the summit that happened last summer, in 2021, where NATO talked about China threatening the rules-based order. That was a turning point because normally in NATO documents China doesn’t merit a mention, and in fact in the last strategic concept, which was released in 2010, there’s no mention of China whatsoever.

Now, fast forward to this Madrid summit that’s coming up at the end of June: there will be a new strategic concept. You’re going to see significantly altered language as it relates to Russia for all the obvious reasons. And if folks are listening and would like an interesting homework project, just pull up the 2010 strategic concept and look at the language on Russia—it’s radically different from the environment that we find ourselves in today. It’s the language—it’s much more hopeful. You’re going to see a different tone as it relates to Russia. But what my prediction is, is that you will also see mention of China in the strategic concept, and there we’re going to be talking about China.

But also what’s been interesting in the last few months is to look at the China-Russia relationship more closely, because it wasn’t more than a couple of months back when we saw the two come out and issue this big statement on their no-limits partnership. The two actually had a joint statement on NATO enlargement. So that’s a change—you see China parroting Russia’s messages on Ukraine, you’ve seen some joint exercises with the two of them—that relationship is evolving and there’s more of a strategic alignment than we’ve seen in recent years. And for that reason, NATO is going to have to respond to that, and talk about the tools it needs and the resources it needs to cope with that particular challenge again in the Euro-Atlantic area. So this is part of the conversation despite the fact that Russia remains front and center.

#### [x] Unique link – NATO adaption required now – narrowly focusing alliance tasks necessary to check China threat

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 193]

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### Uniq: NATO Cohesion Now—Biden Policy

#### Biden’s leadership on Ukraine has put Trump in the rearview mirror

Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, and, Smith, US ambassador to NATO, ‘22

[Dan and Julie, NATO's New Momentum A Conversation With U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith, Foreign Affairs June 9 2022 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum accessed 6/15/22](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum%20accessed%206/15/22) GDI-TM]

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

You are preparing for what may be the most notable NATO summit in many years, if not in decades, and Madrid in late June, but I want to start by going back to a piece you wrote for Foreign Affairs before another rather notable NATO summit in 2018.

The question then was what President Trump was going to do—would he deny the United States’ Article 5 commitments to defend its allies in NATO, would he attack our allies, would he withdraw from NATO. You noted in that piece the limits of what NATO could accomplish without real U.S. leadership, and there were of course fears during the Trump administration that NATO itself would wither. You then arrived at NATO headquarters as the new ambassador in November 2021. To what extent had the actions of the previous administration really affected the alliance? What was the estate of the alliance and the state of U.S. credibility within the alliance when you got to NATO?

JULIE SMITH

Well, I think when I arrived, first and foremost, the mission had been without an ambassador for quite some time. And it was also recovering from two years of operating during a pandemic where many people actually had not been working remotely and had been coming into the office every day, so it was a team that was eager to get back to work in a kind of semi post-COVID environment, although we still grapple with COVID. And it was a mission that was eager to actually have an ambassador in the seat. In terms of the last administration there was a sense that President Trump’s comments, both during the campaign in 2016 and after his arrival in the Oval Office, did call into question America’s role in the NATO alliance. Traditionally, America has a very unique position in the alliance. America leads, always has led, inside NATO. And at the time, in the last administration, we had a president that during the campaign had actually called into question whether or not America’s Article 5 commitments could be contingent on countries’ ability to meet the target of spending 2 percent of GDP on their defense. And laying out the Article 5 commitment as more of a transactional operation definitely spooked the herd and created a lot of uncertainty about America’s intentions, what President Trump wanted to do during his tenure as it related to the alliance, open-ended questions about whether or not he would even attend some future summits.

Now, at the end of the day, some of what he had suggested on the campaign didn’t actually turn out to be how he pursued or approached NATO in practice. But there was a sense that it was time for a reset. By the time I arrived, again, I was excited to try and lift up the team, lift up morale, try to send a clear signal on President Biden’s determination to revitalize alliances, and ever since then that has definitely been my focus and the focus of the entire mission. And frankly I think I think we’ve done a good job, because we’re now in a position where we’ve seen unprecedented levels of unity and we’re in a situation where the allies are clearly radiating and projecting a common sense of resolve as it relates to Russia and Ukraine.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion Now—Strategic Concept

#### Uniqueness – Strategic Concept 2022 and statements of purpose key to NATO strategy and operations

Webber, Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham and the 2022/23 Senior Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College, 2022

[Mark “Extending NATO: retirement plan not required” NATO Review 04 April 2022 [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html accessed 6.16.2022](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html%20accessed%206.16.2022) GDI-TM]

Strategic foresight Survival and success also depend on having the right strategy, but obtaining such a thing is difficult. Some scholars, aware of the bureaucratic and political blinkers that impede clear thinking, have bemoaned the ‘forgotten’ or ‘lost’ art of strategy-making. Others have pointed to strategy’s illusory nature, given its application to circumstances that are usually too unpredictable and too complex to produce the intended results. Despite these obstacles, strategy is ubiquitous. No organisation - whether a government, a military, a company or, indeed, an alliance – can in good conscience face the world without one. Whatever its limitations, strategy is better than the alternatives: taking a shot in the dark, relying on primordial concepts such as honour, reputation and glory, or falling back on habit and path-dependent thinking. Good strategy needs to be constantly adjusted to changing circumstances. It also needs to be appreciative of what is possible (not just what is desirable), and conscious of the resources necessary to meet specified objectives. Above all, as Sir Lawrence Freedman has argued, to adopt a strategy is to embrace choice; it is a recognition that the environment an actor faces can be tamed and not simply allowed to run amok. NATO sits reasonably well within this understanding. Throughout its history, the Alliance has paid considerable attention to formulating and agreeing strategy, and then coordinating Allied efforts on the basis of constantly updated concepts, political guidance, and military doctrine. These efforts often assume enormous political significance. The 1967 Harmel Report on ‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance’, according to one assessment, rescued NATO from ‘the most severe crisis in its history’ following France’s departure from the Alliance’s integrated military structures. The 1990 London Declaration and the 1991 Strategic Concept were similarly pathbreaking and helped NATO transition into the post-Cold War period. These precedents mean NATO’s more recent top-level documents – the Strategic Concepts of 1999 and 2010 as well as the anticipated update of 2022 – come freighted with huge significance. Externally, they are NATO’s public face on the world: key statements of relevance and purpose. Internally, they are important exercises in consensus building among the Allies. But while significant in their own right, the Strategic Concepts are only one expression of NATO’s strategic coherence. Beneath them sit obscure, often classified but, nonetheless, operationally significant statements of purpose. In recent years such documents have been adopted at pace. In 2019, NATO approved a new Military Strategy, and in 2020 two implementing documents - a Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and a Warfighting Capstone Concept. In 2021, the Allies agreed to action plans on climate change and Women, Peace and Security, as well as a ‘Strengthened Resilience Commitment’ and a cyber defence policy. An ‘Overarching Space Policy’ followed in January 2022. NATO is due to formally adopt its new Strategic Concept at the Madrid summit in June 2022. The draft is already being reworked in light of the Ukraine crisis. It seems likely also that the NATO Military Strategy will end up with a revamp shortly after.

#### Getting the Strategic Concept right is vital to the future of NATO—is at a crossroads

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 177]

As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once again finds itself at a crossroads. Diplomats and transatlantic supporters on both sides of the Atlantic collectively expelled a sigh of relief last November that a second Trump term —which many feared might spell the end of the 72-year-old alliance—had not come to pass. However, the mood is far from celebratory in either Washington or European capitals because all parties understand that, to steer clear of irrelevancy and remain “fit for purpose,” NATO needs renewal—the question is how?1

If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its first in a decade. NATO’s current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010 and reflects NATO’s thinking on how to cope with the divisive nature of the War on Terror, and it is inadequate for a changed world of great power rivalry. A new Strategic Concept has long been on the agenda in the corridors of NATO diplomacy, but no one dared open this Pandora’s Box during the Trump presidency.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion Now—Troop Deployments

#### Increased troops deployed

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Strengthening NATO on Its Eastern Flank

On the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 400,000 troops from NATO countries were stationed in West Germany (60 per cent of them American), plus Bundeswehr forces, as well as 60,000 U.S. troops deployed elsewhere in Europe. While it is unlikely that NATO will deploy a comparable number of troops to its eastern flank (including the three Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania), there has been a significant increase in the number of troops in these countries.

Since the Russian invasion, the Pentagon has acknowledged that it must change its defence posture in Europe to increase permanent troop stationing, but also rotational deployments to deal with Russia. An additional 14,000 U.S. troops have been sent to the Baltics, Poland and Hungary, for a total of 100,000

U.S. troops in Europe, up from 80,000 before the war. The Pentagon also repositioned troops and equipment: 800 soldiers left Italy for the Baltics, 20 Apache helicopters went from Germany to the Baltics, 12 from Greece to Poland and 8 F-35s were transferred from Germany to Lithuania, Estonia and Romania. This is in addition to the 12,000 U.S. troops on alert as part of NATO's 40,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF).

In terms of deployment, Britain has almost doubled the number of troops in Estonia from 900 to 1,700. The number of armoured vehicles will increase to 48 and tanks to 24. Also, 350 soldiers will be added to the 100 already present in Poland. Two British ships also joined the eastern Mediterranean in February to conduct monitoring operations alongside other NATO members. France, which is leading the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) this year, has announced that it will lead a new NATO battalion in Romania. To this end, 250 French soldiers (the final number is expected to be twice as many) have recently taken up position on a Romanian base near the Ukrainian border. At the end of February 2022, Italy confirmed the deployment of about 1,350 military personnel in Hungary and Latvia within the framework of NATO, the dispatch of 130 military personnel and 12 combat aircraft to Romania, as well as 235 personnel, 2 ships and a combat aircraft in the Black Sea. In recent days, Berlin has also announced the upcoming deployment of several hundred troops to the Alliance's eastern flank: 350 soldiers are to join the 500 German troops already present in Lithuania; several ships are to be deployed in the Baltic Sea in the near future; a Patriot missile battery will be deployed in Slovakia and integrated into a NATO battle group similar to those in the Baltic States. Germany also plans to deploy half a dozen Eurofighter aircraft to Slovakia. As for Canada, on February 22, before the invasion began, Prime Minister Trudeau had already announced the deployment of 460 additional troops to reinforce the alliance in Eastern Europe. This includes an artillery unit of about 100 soldiers in Latvia, which will join 540 other members of the Armed Forces leading a NATO battle group (Operation REASSURANCE), as well as a second frigate – the HMCS Halifax – and a CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft.

Currently, there are nearly 25,000 military personnel from NATO member countries deployed on the Alliance's eastern flank, not counting the national armies of the eight countries that make up the Alliance. A year ago, however, there were barely half that number. This number is likely to increase in the coming months, especially if the conflict continues. This, together with the desire of Sweden and Finland to join NATO, raises the question of a possible reorganization of the Alliance's structures.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion Now—Ukraine

#### Uniqueness – unity over Ukraine now spillovers over to other agenda items

Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, and, Smith, US ambassador to NATO, ‘22

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DAN KURTZ-PHELAN But part of that was underestimating the Ukrainians, not just overestimating the Russians. I mean, I think the rest of us were surprised as well by the extent of the European reaction, especially probably the German reaction, in the days after the invasion. And, you know, contrary to recent history, in many cases we saw the Europeans moving faster and going farther than the Americans were prepared to at certain points when it came to sanctions and other things. Did that surprise you? JULIE SMITH Yes. As an old Europe hand, I will tell you that there have been countless surprises in the last couple of months. I’ve kind of described it as the impossible becomes possible, and we could talk about Germany in just a second. But there have been so many other twists and turns in how Europe has responded. We’ve had the Swiss freezing assets in ways that we just haven’t seen; we’ve had Norway turn its longstanding policy on not sending weapons to parties to a war to a conflict turning that policy on its head, and now Norway’s providing lethal assistance to Ukraine. We’ve had the European Union in a “peace facility” decide to allocate two billion dollars worth of assistance towards security assistance to Ukraine—I never thought I would see something like that, I think many of us were surprised, but also enthusiastic about that decision by the EU. And then, yes, the Germany piece is perhaps most surprising of all. Again, if you had told me a year ago that it would be this particular coalition, which is delicate and complicated, with social democrats in the lead, that this working with the greens and the FDP, if you would have these three coalition partners go out three days after Russia goes into Ukraine and make this grand announcement about Germany meeting its commitment on spending 2 percent of GDP investing more in their defense, providing assistance, lethal assistance, to Ukraine quite openly, I would have told you that you were dreaming. So this has been a remarkable moment in transatlantic history, but also European history and the history of individual allies. And what Germany decided to do, what Chancellor Scholz decided to do, has had a significant impact on the thinking in other national capitals. I can’t tell you how many times other NATO allies have come up to us and said, well, you know, wow, Berlin’s taking these really bold decisions, we’re going to take a fresh look at our policy on X, Y, and Z. It varies by country. But there’s been this element of inspiration in bold thinking. And I think we have to be grateful that Berlin took this decision and has in fact pushed others to be as bold in other categories. So yeah, it’s been really remarkable to watch this story unfold in terms of the response to February 24. And people like to write these stories and issue last rites on transatlantic unity, and there are a number of stories floating around right now. But that is not the story. Of course we disagree. Of course we have different perspectives. That’s what working at NATO is all about, that’s how you work in multilateral organizations: there are debates, but it is a story of unity and resolve, fundamentally, and I think we will look back on this moment, on this period of time, as a pivotal moment in the transatlantic relationship. DAN KURTZ-PHELAN What worries you about keeping that unity together and sustaining that resolve over time? And, I mean, even taking your point, there certainly are reasons to think it’s going to be hard to maintain that given the political costs—the risks, food prices, energy prices, everything else. What concerns you, and what can be done to sustain that? JULIE SMITH Well, look, maintaining unity takes work, and nobody can step back and assume that the level of unity that we have right now is sustainable over, let’s say, many, many months or years. So we will continue to work with our allies to address the issues now that are bubbling to the surface. There’s a broader set of issues now at play above and beyond the war in Ukraine. There are concerns around the world about food security, which we’re spending a lot of time on. There are concerns about energy prices and the decisions that have just recently been made in the European union as it relates to their reliance on Russian oil and gas. And there are broader concerns in the wake of the pandemic just about the global economy and how the war is going to impact our societies, our publics, and public opinion on this war. Right now, I think most Europeans understand the severity of the situation, the seriousness of this, and the reason why we all have to hold the line and work together to support Ukraine in this moment—what it represents above and beyond the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. That it says a lot about the future of the rules-based order, it says a lot about democracy, it says a lot about territorial integrity and sovereignty. And so we will have to keep working at it.

#### Russia invasion settled focus on increased contributions and troops within NATO

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Although tensions remain, the Russian invasion succeeded in creating a strong understanding and coordination between the Allies, even contributing to the emergence of consensus (still precarious, however) on the internal political scenes of the member states (Part I). Several measures to strengthen NATO's capabilities were thus quickly decided and implemented (Part II), such as increases in the defence budgets of several countries and the deployment of new troops in Eastern Europe. Moreover, we are witnessing the definitive settlement of the question of the 2% of GDP to be invested in defence: this amount can no longer be contested, at least not without significant political risks for its opponents. The developments at work will therefore bring about possible changes within NATO, more precisely with regard to its military hierarchy and the different positions that make it up (Part III). This does not, however, negate certain risks (Part III) in the short and medium term for the organization, in particular in the event of a prolonged conflict. Since the invasion also has repercussions for the EU and China, given the Alliance's links with the former and its concerns about the latter, although the focus is on NATO, this report will deal with these two aspects in a final part (Part IV).

NATO's return to strength is undeniable, including vis-à-vis other organizations such as the European Union. It is part of a new context created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that of a new "Cold War" rather than a Third World War. Certainly, several characteristics differ between this new "Cold War" and the political and international context that prevailed between 1949 and 1989. Nevertheless, it remains true that there is once again a power across the Arctic and east of Europe that clearly represents a threat to the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of its immediate neighbours.

#### US collaborative leadership on Ukraine increases cohesion

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

I. A Newfound Cohesion

Although there have been a few false notes since February 24, it is quite surprising to see how harmonious the orchestra played by the members of the Alliance is, especially when one analyzes the behaviour of certain countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Even if certain rivalries remain, most of the major countries – especially those that have distinguished themselves in recent years by controversial or even questionable actions or measures – are each taking their share of responsibility and are succeeding for the moment in acting in concert (or at least in giving this impression for the most part). This newfound cohesion is also present in the national political scenes of the member states. In more than one country, the political positions of certain anti-NATO, anti-American or pro- Russian political parties have been greatly attenuated. Other political movements that were not previously suspected of being sympathetic to the EU and NATO are tending to take public positions in favour of them.

A Faded American Leadership

While the debacle in Afghanistan and the AUKUS affair revealed an absence of leadership on the part of the United States and the new Biden administration, the Russian-Ukrainian war constitutes in this respect a reactivation of the latter within the transatlantic community. Although one cannot speak of Leading from Behind, the management by the United States and the strong roles it is leaving in this crisis to some of its allies – in particular the United Kingdom, France, and Poland – is quite singular. While Washington naturally remains the primus inter pares within the Alliance, its current management favours the prominence of London, Paris, and Warsaw on this issue, and in so doing succeeds in increasing the effects of drive and cohesion within the Alliance.

#### Major NATO countries recommitted to NATO post invasion

Borzillo, 2022

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While the United States has been pursuing its strategy of pivoting towards the Pacific for more than ten years, the Russian invasion has clearly suspended this movement, with troops once again being sent to Europe. Over the past month, several American statements have helped to reaffirm the American commitment to the defence of Europe in the face of the threat posed by Moscow. For its part, contrary to its long-standing reputation as a reluctant ally within NATO, Paris has taken several measures in favour of the Alliance. Taking advantage of the French presidency of the Council of the European Union, President Macron has taken on the role of coordinating the Europeans with the Ukrainian president, but also, at Zelensky's request, a contact role with the Russian president. Although some voices continue to criticize the French position, although still advocating for European strategic autonomy, Paris has so far managed to avoid distinguishing itself negatively from its allies, while assuming a leadership role on a European scale in partnership with other capitals. However, this role is somewhat neglected in the final phase of the campaign for the French presidential election. Yet, it is likely to become stronger again after the election (if Emmanuel Macron is re-elected). At the same time, the war in Ukraine offers Boris Johnson the opportunity to put forward London's leadership on an issue it has championed since 2014. The agreement between the UK, Poland and Ukraine reached days before the British invasion (though still in the making) is a demonstration of Britain's commitment to remain, in the words of the Integrated Review, "the key European ally in NATO."

#### Consensus on need to maintain NATO – Germany and Italy prove

Borzillo, 2022

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A New Consensus

A certain consensus is also emerging on the Russian threat and the need to maintain NATO. Despite the strength of the Trumpist current, support for Ukraine is one of the rare points where there is still consensus in the United States, even if the modalities of this support remain debated. In France, the Russophile and pro-Kremlin rhetoric – including that of several major candidates in the presidential election – tends to be forgotten, masked, or at least strongly attenuated, the entire political class condemning Russian aggression.

Traditionally, Germany had always been a reliable and faithful member of the Alliance. However, the arrival in power of a government comprising the SPD and the Greens raised fears that this position would change, with some members of these two parties being fiercely critical of both NATO and nuclear weapons. Although there are still dissenting voices, the Russian invasion has put an end to any strong questioning of this characteristic feature of German defence policy in recent decades. Thus, a strong consensus in favour of the Alliance is now returning, despite the absence of the Christian Democrats of the CDU/CSU in government.

Similarly, Italy, which used to be ambivalent about its relationship with Russia, has now become aware that Russia can no longer be a reliable partner on the international scene, and now seems to be fully asserting its Europeanist and transatlantic identity, which guides its foreign policy and defence choices. If initially the main pro-Russian and anti-militarist party, the 5-Star Movement, did not want to explicitly name Russia as responsible at the beginning of the conflict, it now fully supports the government on sanctions against the country as well as on the increase of military personnel within NATO on the eastern front.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion High—A2 “Afghanistan”

#### Post Afghanistan doubling of consultation re-establishing trust with NATO allies

Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, and, Smith, US ambassador to NATO, ‘22

[Dan and Julie, NATO's New Momentum A Conversation With U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith, Foreign Affairs June 9 2022 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum accessed 6/15/22](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum%20accessed%206/15/22) GDI-TM]

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

I think it’s fair to say, without rendering judgment on the wisdom or not of the basic policy decision, that the withdrawal from Afghanistan had also undermined trust in the alliance and there were certainly lots of complaints from U.S. allies—especially NATO allies—about U.S. communication about the way that unfolded. What was the state of the conversation about Afghanistan withdrawal, and what were the lessons that you and the rest of your team took from that as you went into the Ukraine decision?

JULIE SMITH

Yeah, you’re right. In the fall of 2021 there was some increased tension across the alliance over the decision by the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan. Some allies had raised concerns about the way in which the United States had consulted on that decision. Some allies felt that they hadn’t been consulted enough on that particular decision. And we also had in the fall of last year some fallout over AUKUS in particular. So when I arrived in late November, early December, what was happening already was a very intense effort to return to the practice of intense consultations. And what we did in those final weeks of 2021 all the way up to the present day is a very concerted effort to ensure that at every turn, whether it’s on particular U.S. policy decisions or our views on a NATO-related matter, we have doubled down on consultations across the alliance—and we’ve heard some allies say we’ve never seen consultation like this throughout the history of the NATO alliance. So there does seem to be now an appreciation that the United States is making a good faith effort, and whether it’s the nuclear posture review or the global posture review or the national defense strategy or our views on Russia-Ukraine or China, we are making sure that our allies are familiar with our thinking even before some of the decisions have been finalized, and certainly after a decision has been made. We’ve worked to brief allies on the thinking behind that decision and what our position is rooted in, what kind of thinking it’s rooted in.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion High—A2 “Defense Spending Disputes”

#### Russia invasion settles defense spending debate

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

II. Towards A Strengthening of NATO's Capabilities However, the rediscovered cohesion is only one illustration of NATO's resurrection, and the current developments in armaments budgets are another eloquent example, as is the deployment of troops on the eastern flank. The Programmed End of the Burden-Sharing Debate The war in Ukraine is indeed accelerating the increase in defence spending in many Alliance member countries. It also marks the likely end of the nearly 20-year-old debate over the 2% defence spending within NATO. Dating back to NATO's 2006 Riga Summit, this less binding commitment by allies to spend 2% of their GDP on defence has been a regular bone of contention between Europeans and Americans. Given the generally low estimate of the Russian threat in recent years and U.S. pressure – especially under Donald Trump's tenure – for some states the issue simply came down to buying new F- 35 fighter jets. The Russian invasion, however, mostly puts an end to this procrastination and debate. In fact, it is likely that in the near future the debate will no longer be about 2% that almost all states will have reached, but rather about the reality of each state's military power, given the expenses incurred. Among the major NATO states, three groups seem to be forming at the moment: those that have radically changed their position; those that are not changing their spending forecasts; and those that are increasing their spending a little, or for whom this is beginning to be considered.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion High—A2 “Hungary”

#### Hungary resistance limited impact on cohesion

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Persistent Tensions

Whether on the issue of arms and equipment deliveries to Ukraine or on the issue of sanctions, there is still a great deal of cohesion among the allies. While the European Union has already pledged one and a half billion euros in military supplies, the United States has just pledged a package of 14 billion dollars for the Ukrainian crisis, although half of it is intended for the deployment of American troops in Europe. Coordination on economic sanctions, however, involves more intensive exchanges between the allies, with some differences remaining, although much has already been accomplished in the space of a few weeks. For example, Germany has taken the symbolic decision to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which was intended to increase Russian gas deliveries to Germany. However, some European countries, including Germany and Italy, remain heavily dependent on Russian imports. While Berlin, Paris and London are still reluctant to deprive themselves of Russian hydrocarbons, Washington has ordered an embargo on American imports of Russian oil and gas. The United States is thus pushing Europeans to reopen the debate on energy independence.

While even countries such as Germany and Italy, which traditionally showed understanding or even leniency towards Moscow, have since changed their stance, one country still stands out as regards both sanctions and arms deliveries: Victor Orban's Hungary. However, its capacity for influence is limited and for the moment it is not in a position to block the measures taken by other countries. Its position could change, however, as a result of pressure from its usual allies in the Visegrad Group, and the risk of complete isolation for Budapest is not without danger, both within the EU and in NATO.

### Uniq: NATO Cohesion High—A2 “Turkey”

#### Despite tensions, even Turkey on board with NATO in response to Russia

Borzillo, 2022

[Laurent, “The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO” Policy Report Network for Strategic Analysis April 2022 - Issue 17 google Scholar – UT accessed 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

The case of Turkey further illustrates the return of strong cohesion within NATO. An ambivalent ally, Turkey had been under U.S. sanctions since 2019 following the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems, as well as under European sanctions for humanitarian reasons and because of its positioning in Syria. Strong tensions and incidents had even occurred with Paris and Athens in recent years. However, without supporting Western sanctions against Russia, Turkey has strongly condemned the Russian invasion and reiterated its support for the physical integrity and independence of Ukraine, but also for NATO's "open door" policy. Ankara has also blocked the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits to Russian warships in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936. Even more surprisingly, the French president announced on March 25 the launch of a humanitarian operation to evacuate civilians from Mariupol in close coordination with Turkey and Greece. However, the operation could not take place due to the decisions taken by Moscow.

### Uniq: Territorial Defense Focus Now

#### NATO re-embracing territorial defense now – multiple examples

Deni, 2022

[John R. research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, “NATO’s New (Old) Mission: Territorial Defense” Carnegie Europe March 22, 2022 [https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689 accessed 6.17.2022](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689%20accessed%206.17.2022) GDI-TM]

Later this week, NATO leaders will gather in Brussels for an extraordinary snap summit, building upon the defense ministerial last week and the virtual leaders’ summit held in late February 2022.

Top of the agenda will be adapting the alliance to the new normal in European security, characterized by a reckless, aggressive Russia apparently bent on re-establishing a sphere of influence across Eastern Europe. Part of NATO’s adaptation should include an uncompromising re-embrace of territorial defense.

To some degree, the alliance has been re-embracing territorial defense since 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea.

The Kremlin’s actions then prompted a dramatic reappraisal of the alliance’s ways and means. As a result, defense spending grew across the alliance after having declined, on average, for nearly a quarter century. Equipment modernization was given a kickstart through these budgetary increases, and in some cases allies expanded their military ~~man~~power.

Readiness—an otherwise esoteric topic left to defense policy experts—became the subject of conversation among presidents and prime ministers as NATO expanded its exercises and rejuvenated its rapid response forces. And the alliance decided to deploy four 1,200-person multinational battlegroups among the three Baltic states and Poland on a persistent basis, to both help defend those countries and act as a kind of tripwire should Russia attack.

#### Troop deployments focused response to Russia

Scowcroft Center Task Force on Deterrence and Force Posture, 2022

[Issue Brief – Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe March 9, 2022 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/> accessed 6.17.2022 GDI-TM]

US and Allied Posture Adjustments So Far

In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and since the outbreak of hostilities, the United States and NATO allies have undertaken numerous steps to bolster allied force posture in Eastern Europe, enhancing deterrence against more robust Russian aggression and demonstrating the Alliance’s ability to defend its eastern flank. Importantly, deployments have come from a diverse group of European and North American allies, and the activation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) will spur additional contributions. All told, the United States will have activated an additional fourteen thousand troops for deploy- ment in Europe, along with twenty-eight fighters, four B-52 bombers, six tanker aircraft, and four warships. This brings to- tal US personnel in Europe to nearly one hundred thousand.

European allies have made important contributions as well, with Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom all reinforc- ing their NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in the Baltic states, France deploying forces to Romania as part of NATO’s activation of elements of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and allies such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain sending additional aircraft to NATO’s air policing missions. With the activation of the NRF, it is likely we will see more troop commitments from European allies, as the majority of NRF forces are sourced from Europe. While the NRF is meant to be a temporary deployment, many of the European deployments, both those under way and those announced for the near future, lay the groundwork for a per- manently larger NATO presence along its eastern flank, and should be built upon. A detailed list of posture adjustments undertaken by the Alliance can be found in the Appendix.

#### Sustained confrontation with Russia focuses on territorial sovereignty

Scowcroft Center Task Force on Deterrence and Force Posture, 2022

[Issue Brief – Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe March 9, 2022 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/> accessed 6.17.2022 GDI-TM]

We are now in a new era of sustained confrontation with Russia. It is not a broad-based competition for influence across numerous domains (e.g. economic), as is the case with China; rather, it is a dynamic confrontation throughout the transatlantic theater, most heatedly along NATO’s eastern flank from the Arctic in the north to the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south. Russia wishes to push its influence or direct control of territory as far west, north, and south as possible, especially in the former Soviet states.

Russia has now demonstrated both the intent and capability to mass forces to underwrite a sustained coercive-diplomacy campaign and invade the sovereign territory of another nation. Moreover, now that Russian forces have undertaken operations in Ukraine, Putin may decide to further threaten the territory and freedom of action of additional non-NATO members, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Finland—as well as NATO members themselves.

### Uniq: A2 “Ukraine Policy Causes Escalation Now”

#### NATO limited involvement in Ukraine – avoids escalation

Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, and, Smith, US ambassador to NATO, ‘22

[Dan and Julie, NATO's New Momentum A Conversation With U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith, Foreign Affairs June 9 2022 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum accessed 6/15/22](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/natos-new-momentum%20accessed%206/15/22) GDI-TM]

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Given the likelihood that this war goes on in one form or another for a long time—it doesn’t seem like we’re especially close to a negotiated outcome, given where things are on the battlefield, neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians seem especially inclined to bend on key demands at this point—the risk of escalation between Russia and NATO and Russia and United States seems to grow over time. What worries you when it comes to escalation?

JULIE SMITH

Well, we spend a lot of time thinking about escalation, and I turn to President Biden all the time to make sure I understand, again, what his objectives are, where he wants America to engage, where he doesn’t. One thing that’s changed is the types of assistance that we’ve provided to Ukraine, and that’s because the conversations we have with them on a daily basis are evolving thanks to events on the ground. And while we were focused early on things like air defense and ammunition, we’ve had conversations with them about coastal defense, we’ve had conversations with them about the need for armored vehicles, and now advanced rocket systems. But there are some things that haven’t changed. What hasn’t changed is the president’s determination to avoid making NATO a party to this conflict—and NATO allies are agreed on that position.

No one inside the NATO alliance is suggesting that NATO start providing lethal assistance. Individual NATO allies are providing assistance, but NATO as an organization is not, and we were all clear in that. The president has been clear in stating that American troops will not be part of this conflict, and I don’t see that changing either. So, yes, we will have to continue to have our conversations about escalation and escalation management and ensure that our effort has to be to stop the conflict—to stop the war in Ukraine and ensure that it doesn’t expand beyond Ukraine’s borders. So that will continue to be part of my objective in Brussels, but also my colleagues back here in Washington.

# Links

## Link: General

### Link: Defense & Deterrence Only

#### NATO focus on defense and deterrence core mission in new threat environment—key to effectiveness

Keil, Senior Fellow, Security and Defense Policy GMF, 2022

[Steven, German Marshall Fund - non-partisan policy organization studying transatlantic interests “NATO Core Tasks in a Contested Global Landscape” German Marshall Fund February 11, 2022 [https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape GDI-TM 6.16.2022](https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape%20GDI-TM%206.16.2022)]

Introduction

When NATO set its last strategic concept in 2010, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine, the alliance had not conducted operations in Libya, the Syrian civil war had not started, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was a little-known local insurgent group, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was still in place, and China was not on NATO’s radar. The same year, the United States would be again surging troops to Afghanistan and setting a timetable for withdrawal by 2014. Both sides of the Atlantic struggled with the lasting threat of terrorism but, as NATO allies looked out at the world, they concluded that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.” Fast forward ten years and the picture is very different.

Russia’s willingness to use force to change borders in Europe, annex Crimea, and further pressure Ukraine with a coercive military buildup directly contests the notion that the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace. The deployment of Russian intermediate-range capabilities in Kaliningrad brings back memories of the prospect of limited nuclear conflict in Europe. Moreover, new technologies and domains are blurring the lines of conflict, creating new concerns of escalation, and impacting how allies and adversaries understand deterrence.

In this context, NATO staff and member states are again taking pen to paper to chart the alliance’s course and reinforce its mission. The key task will be to match NATO’s strategic outlook to the threat environment today and over the next several years. This will span regional and functional domains, including some that were not considered over a decade ago when the last concept was completed.

Given developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic area over the past decade and more, elevating and reigniting the role of defense and deterrence should be at the center of NATO deliberations. This will require members to reassess core assumptions about their own defense, including understanding pressures on US foreign policy and European contributions to the alliance. To help understand and respond to these internal trends, this brief unpacks these key themes that will be critical in NATO’s ability to shore up its collective defense and assert deterrence for a Euro-Atlantic area more insecure and under threat.

#### Deterrence focus key to avert conflict escalation with Russia – including hybrid warfare deterrence

Keil, Senior Fellow, Security and Defense Policy GMF, 2022

[Steven, German Marshall Fund - non-partisan policy organization studying transatlantic interests “NATO Core Tasks in a Contested Global Landscape” German Marshall Fund February 11, 2022 [https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape GDI-TM 6.16.2022](https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape%20GDI-TM%206.16.2022)]

Deterrence and Defense are NATO’s Primary Tasks

Changes in the strategic environment have always forced NATO to rethink and reposition itself. But adaptation has never fundamentally altered its core purpose as defined by the Washington Treaty, which holds that an attack on one is an attack on all. Rather, as NATO evolved, a mutual commitment to collective defense has been the crucial through line.

Yet, the conclusions of the 2010 Strategic Concept conceived the need for collective action differently. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, and NATO’s Article V mission in Afghanistan, alongside engagements in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism weighed heavily. Informally, core deterrence efforts took a back seat as crisis management and cooperative security took on added importance.

Russia’s most recent military buildup along the borders of Ukraine—and its willingness to use force or the threat of force for coercive purposes—underscores how outdated this strategic framework is. The chances of an escalation of conflict between NATO and Russia are at their highest level in decades. Consequently, the role of deterrence in averting conflict and added capability to undergird NATO’s core collective-defense commitments is crucial. While the current Strategic Concept may be outdated, the alliance overall has not been stagnant. Responding to a deteriorating Euro-Atlantic security environment since 2014, allies reinforced eastern member states, creating the Enhanced Forward Presence, which sent four multinational battle groups to the Baltic states and Poland. It also launched and formalized other efforts like the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the Four Thirties Readiness Initiative.

Moreover, NATO—in coordination with the European Union—must bolster deterrence by finding ways to address untraditional, hybrid challenges that span military and civilian domains.

But Russia’s actions over recent months have only further cemented the concern of NATO member states and the need for added deterrence measures. On the conventional side, this could include an increased military footprint in key allies in Eastern Europe either on a permanent or rotational basis. But the alliance also needs to ensure the viability and readiness of existing mechanisms, like the NATO Response Force, the VJTF, and the Four Thirties Readiness Initiative.

Moreover, NATO—in coordination with the European Union—must bolster deterrence by finding ways to address untraditional, hybrid challenges that span military and civilian domains. This should include further refining tools such as NATO’s counter-hybrid support teams as agreed in 2018, as well as augmenting NATO’s Intelligence and Security Division to create a greater capacity for information sharing to alert allies of vulnerabilities spanning cyber defense, energy security, disinformation, and others. These efforts can ultimately help deter nefarious activities that are below the threshold of conventional conflict but pose a significant threat to escalate above it.

### Link: Institutional Overlap

#### Streamlining key to NATO effectiveness – failure to prioritize and unload onto other institutions issues outside core NATO focus undermines capacity to address China and Russia

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize.

Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades.

Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local policing and counter-radicalization programs; and financial instruments that agencies like Europol, Interpol, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and others are better equipped to lead than an overstretched military alliance. The same is true when it comes to other activities the transatlantic alliance has added to its roster since 1991, like stabilization missions and security sector reform. In fact, organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the European Union provide more appropriate venues for tackling many of the collective security duties the alliance has assumed since the 1990s. As a regional defensive military alliance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in providing territorial defense against other states or groups of states. This is a comparative advantage that should be preserved, not diluted by the addition of other security tasks. True comparative advantage arises from specialization. Continuing to add more and more security responsibilities to NATO’s already-full plate risks transforming the military alliance into a glorified clearinghouse or administrative apparatus whose sole task is the facilitation of information-sharing rather than the provision of collective defense.

Yes, NATO is better equipped to handle the myriad security problems its members face than any other multilateral security organization in existence today. But the proposition that because NATO has the resources and coordinating mechanisms it should automatically take on the latest mission du jour is what has led to a strategically deadlocked alliance.

### Link: Investment Tradeoff

#### Investment in tech improvements directly trades off with territorial defense capacity

\*note ev does conclude China cyber threat a thing – only read with Russia impact or versus non-cyber

Deni, 2022

[John R. research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, “NATO’s New (Old) Mission: Territorial Defense” Carnegie Europe March 22, 2022 [https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689 accessed 6.17.2022](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689%20accessed%206.17.2022) GDI-TM]

To adequately defend allied territory and bolster stability going forward, the alliance should consider several key strategic and operational moves.

Among the first of these is a more fulsome embrace of collective defense as the core NATO task for the foreseeable future. There’s no more appropriate vehicle for this than the alliance’s new strategy, which is currently under development. While it would be nice to think that NATO could devote equal attention to its other core tasks—crisis management and cooperative security—allied resources are not limitless. Given the scale of the Russia challenge, prioritization of collective defense makes sense.

At the operational level, a 360-degree approach to alliance security—that is, devoting equal attention to threats from all directions—seems equally a bridge too far, at least in the short run. Most of the major European allies are in the midst of trading capacity for capability; that is, they are limiting or even reducing total military force levels in order to invest in advanced military capabilities.

Although this effort at qualitative, technological improvement is necessary, it means NATO allies will be somewhat hampered in trying to achieve a more robust territorial defense capacity, especially as their more advanced capabilities take time to come online over the next several years.

Only by prioritizing the multifaceted threat from Russia—as well as China in terms of cyber threats—will the alliance best position itself to meet the demands of the new security environment in Europe.

## Link: Policy Focus

### Link: 2NC

#### Broad resilience focus undermines NATO’s efforts to bolster cohesion and collective defense spending

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 189]

As noted, the allies have come far in terms of military defense spending since 2014. But NATO has only just begun to translate this effort into military reality and cannot afford to take its eye off the ball. Preliminary assessments in 2020 of the national capability targets set by members following their pledge at the 2014 Wales Summit to pour resources into heavy, high-end, and ready forces indicate more work is needed.39 It will take considerable political focus and energy to take this process beyond the infancy stage in which it still finds itself.

The broad agenda of hybrid or grey zone warfare and societal resilience complicates matters. NATO once referred to the latter as civil emergency planning or civil preparedness, and while the current resiliency pledge has a similar focus on prepping NATO allies for collective defense, it is broad to the point of slipperiness. NATO needs to define in greater measure the relationship between its core military capacities and its Warsaw Summit 2016 pledge to protect the “continuity of government, continuity of essential services and security of critical civilian infrastructure,” wherein most of the effort will lie at the national level and not directly relate to NATO’s core collective defense task.40

COVID-19 will in particular drive nations to view such “continuity” in public health terms, and there is simply a limit to how far NATO should delve into such matters. NATO and the EU have both recognized that most resilience efforts lie at the national, not the collective, level, and the two organizations have pledged to continue to work together to strengthen the resilience of their respective member states.41 However, the lines specifying the division of labor between the EU and NATO should be developed further, with NATO only engaging this broad agenda at the points where there are quite clear implications for military capacities.

#### Collective defense focus is vital NATO’s effectiveness—U.S. leadership in this area is key

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 84-85]

NATO’s period of reflection could prove the fulcrum for the Alliance’s future trajectory, with geopolitical implications that ripple beyond Europe and the United States. Since its inception, NATO has done more than any other multilateral organization to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe and the broader transatlantic community with benefits that have rippled out to the broader global community. Ensuring that NATO can face the challenges of the 21st century while safeguarding and vitalizing collective defense—the heart of the Alliance—is the charge of the upcoming reflection period.

In this important moment, American leadership cannot be replaced. The United States must ensure that the reflection outcome firmly moors a future NATO to both sides of the Atlantic, refocuses the allies on the raison d’être of collective defense (including the associated necessities of robust defense spending and vigorous capabilities in increasingly vital spheres like cyber warfare and information warfare), while at the same time ensuring NATO’s readiness to address a range of growing challenges. Getting this balance right requires an understanding of where the Alliance has been, where it is now, and where it is headed. The outcome of the reflection process will provide vital guideposts for striking the proper balance and ensuring the vitality of NATO for the next 70 years and beyond.

### \*Link: China Focus

#### Focusing on China fractures the alliance and undermines its ability to deter Russia

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 17-18]

Individual NATO member states, and even the supranational EU with its particular policy competencies, have more tools to deal with an emboldened China than does NATO as an institution. NATO can deepen its existing engagements with Indo-Pacific countries. This will ease cooperation with these governments and militaries in the future and strengthen them (marginally) against Chinese encroachment. It may also contribute to the governments involved reaching common diplomatic positions, on freedom of navigation for instance. Until China poses a military threat in the North Atlantic Region, as an institution created for the purpose of collective security, NATO should have a very limited role when it comes to dealing the challenges posed by Beijing.

The reflection period offers NATO an opportunity to state clearly what its responsibilities are when it comes to China, and what its approach will be. To ensure that NATO does not lose focus on actual military threats closer to home it must:

\* Acknowledge the Alliance’s limitations when confronting some of China’s non-military threats and push member states to do more. Some of the biggest challenges posed by China to NATO’s member states deal with investments in critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns, and encroachments in the technology sector using Huawei’s 5G. NATO should not pretend to lead on an issue for which it lacks the needed policy competencies. Therefore, while policymakers should look to NATO to provide a robust conventional and nuclear deterrence for members of the Alliance, only the national capitals, and in some cases the EU, have the political and economic tools that can reduce the economic and political threats posed by China.

\* Not let itself be distracted. With the BRI creeping inside Europe’s borders, the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, the mass internment of the Uighur population, and the ongoing 5G debate in Europe, it is no surprise that China is a major concern for Western policymakers—and rightfully so. However, for NATO, the most immediate threat, and the threat for which it was created and for which it has the tools, is Russia. NATO should focus first and foremost on this threat.

\* Be realistic about the military threat facing the Alliance in the North Atlantic area. At the time of this writing, Russian–Chinese military activity in NATO’s area of responsibility as described in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty has amounted to two different exercises, spanning a total of 13 days, consisting of a total of six PLAN ships over the course of the past five years. While NATO should monitor Russian–Chinese military cooperation, the Alliance must recognize that its number one priority is Russia.

\* Not let China divide the Alliance. As seen in the single sentence devoted to China in NATO’s joint statement, there is no agreement inside the Alliance on what role, if any, NATO should play in dealing with Beijing. When Alliance unity in the face of Russian aggression is vital, now is not the time for NATO to divide itself over the issue of China. This only benefits Moscow and Beijing.

#### China is not a core alliance issues—should be dealt with by coordinated outside action by member states

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 19]

Encourage the member states to coordinate military strategy regarding China. While NATO as an institution should limit its military focus on China, for certain member states, China is a main driver of foreign and defense policy. This is particularly true of the U.S., and to a lesser extent, Canada, France, and the U.K. Military training exercises in the Indo–Pacific, or Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, should be coordinated on a multilateral or a bilateral basis at the member-state level.

### Link: Cyber focus

#### Cyber threats and capabilities best addressed by individual countries

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 79]

\* Understand the range of threats presented by cyberattacks. NATO faces a cyber threat not only from Russia but also from state actors, including China and Iran, as well as non-state actors. While the Alliance must continue to harden its networks, NATO should recognize that, ultimately, the bulk of cyber defense will fall to individual nations and as such should encourage robust attention to cyber capabilities amongst the 30 allies.

### Link: Disinformation Focus

#### Broader focus on disinformation distracts NATO from its core defense mission

Larsen, CSS Senior Researcher, ‘22

[Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Sexurity Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” LAWFARE, 5—22—22, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>, accessed 5-23-22]

First, NATO needs to make clear the aspects of resilience for which it is not placed to lead. As a rule, the more NATO engages the civilian aspects of security, the more it moves away from its mandate. The alliance seems to have no natural role in law enforcement—such as fighting foreign influence operations or weaponized corruption—because of the variety in allied legislative frameworks and the existence of other established channels for ordinary police cooperation. NATO may be able to play a bigger role in coordinating between intelligence services on counterterrorism (against Russia) and counterintelligence (both Russia and China). The challenges arising from disinformation are real, as seen during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but NATO has no role in countering foreign efforts to undermine public trust in the functioning of democratic institutions in its allies. The alliance should confine its anti-disinformation efforts to military affairs and Russian attempts to depict the alliance as an aggressor and a violator of the agreements that brought the Cold War to an end.

### Link: Expanded Agenda

#### Adding to core tasks fragments NATO focus by going broad and shallow through more tasks reduces effectiveness—threatens ability to deal with Russia and China

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 178]

NATO is thus confronted with the choice of whether to merely update its old Strategic Concept from 2010 or do a 360 degree top-to-bottom review of it. A simple update would entail a broad focus on a growing range of “core tasks” running on parallel tracks. Stoltenberg has indicated a preference for this option, which is reflective of a complex and unwieldy security environment.5 But more of the same carries a risk of diluting NATO both politically and militarily: it would fragment NATO’s political focus, leave the deterrence of Russia incomplete, and fail to define collective defense interests in regard to China. In other words, there is a real risk that NATO will seek the wrong kind of renewal: going “broad and shallow” by taking on more tasks and/or elevating existing missions, like counterterrorism, to sit alongside collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security as “core tasks” of equal importance, as it did when it elevated the latter two mandates in 2010.6 NATO should instead go “narrow and deep” on collective defense, recommitting itself to its original purpose of deterring and defending against systemic rivals.

### Link: Hybrid Warfare Focus

#### NATO cannot address hybrid threats—should be a national government responsibility

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 79]

As the Alliance and its members grapple with the threat of hybrid warfare, the U.S. and NATO should use the reflection process to:

\* Acknowledge the Alliance’s limitations when confronting hybrid threats, and push member states to do more to prevent hybrid warfare on their territories. NATO should not pretend to lead on an issue for which it lacks the competency. Ultimately, good governance, economic freedom, and trusted law enforcement and security services are the best bet for stopping a hybrid war before it even starts. So, while policymakers should look toward NATO to provide a robust conventional and nuclear deterrence for members of the Alliance, only the national capitals can establish the political and economic conditions that can prevent Russia and other adversaries from using hybrid tactics effectively.

#### NATO lacks effective tools and policy competencies to address hybrid threats—national governments better

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 74-75]

Hybrid warfare must be prevented or deterred—it is not something that can be easily overcome once it has begun. Once the social, political, and economic conditions exist to allow hybrid tactics to be effective, it is probably too late to stop them. This is why NATO should accept that it plays a secondary role to national governments in dealing with hybrid threats. As with counterterrorism, NATO as an intergovernmental institution lacks many of the required tools and policy competencies to counter hybrid threats.

There are three main ways to counter hybrid threats and to mitigate its impact:

1. Establish good governance on the local and national level. If people feel like they are governed fairly and governed well, they become less susceptible to disinformation and propaganda campaigns by Russia or other adversaries. Where there is endemic corruption, a lack of strong local government, and the disconnection of central government to legitimate political grievances on the local level, the stage is set for Russian meddling.

2. Encourage economic freedom. People need economic stability and the belief that their children have a bright economic future. Pursuing pro-growth policies that help increase economic prosperity is an important part of countering hybrid tactics. People who feel as if they have economic opportunities are less susceptible to foreign meddling.

3. Help to create a bond of trust and respect between the average person and law enforcement and the intelligence services. If people believe they are policed fairly and that intelligence services are not overstepping their bounds, a society will become more resilient against hybrid tactics, Russian or otherwise.

In addition, law enforcement is often the first line of defense in a hybrid war scenario. A very capable and professional law enforcement and intelligence service can mitigate the effectiveness of provocateurs acting on behalf of Moscow

### Link: Resiliency Focus

#### Resilience strategies undermine the core collective defense mission

Larsen, CSS Senior Researcher, ‘22

[Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Sexurity Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” LAWFARE, 5—22—22, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>, accessed 5-23-22]

In the coming years, NATO needs to balance the impetus toward being a “liberal bulwark” with its traditional role as a defense alliance. To do so will require a thorough understanding of the strategic environment, particularly the threat posed by Russia and the challenges posed by China. NATO must adapt by better delineating what aspects of security planning it is best suited to and what would be better delegated to other institutions, while prioritizing partnerships that share NATO values. As the drafting of the Strategic Concept is being finalized and moving toward formal adoption by the NATO allies in Madrid in June, it is crucial to avoid the temptation to define “resilience” as a core task. The Strategic Concept from 2010 outlined the core tasks of “collective defense,” “crisis management” and “cooperative security,” but adding a fourth core task this time around would further confuse what is core to the alliance. NATO needs to prioritize and refocus on collective defense, its original and continued raison d’être. The digital age and the significance of political warfare is bringing about new challenges, but the transatlantic alliance is better off tying resilience to collective defense as an integral part of it rather than risking the inflation of core tasks.

#### Focus on resiliency risks drift from core mission of defense capabilities

Larsen, CSS Senior Researcher, ‘22

[Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Sexurity Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” LAWFARE, 5—22—22, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>, accessed 5-23-22]

Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities.

NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

### Link: Nontraditional Threats

#### Expanded definition of threats – including cyber and information - risks weakening perception of NATO effectiveness

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 9-10]

Often, NATO members do not share the same concerns in terms of threats and security challenges. Usually, this divide inside the Alliance is geographical. In general terms, Eastern Europeans see Russia as the main threat to the Alliance. In contrast, Southern Europeans see spill-over from the Middle East and North Africa, usually in the form of refugees and transnational terrorism, as the main cause for concern. At other times, the divide is more about NATO’s functional role. Some want NATO to be more expeditionary with a focus on counterterrorism and out-of-area operations. Others want the Alliance to focus on non-traditional threats to cybersecurity, energy security, and truthful information.

In reality, NATO must deal with all of these threat concerns—both geographical and cross-functional. However, policymakers must realize that there are limits to what NATO, as an institution, can do. When policymakers expect NATO to do something it was never designed to do, that creates a perception of failure, frustration, and weakness of the Alliance. For example, NATO lacks legislative powers and policy competency on key issues, such as energy security, immigration, and border control. Yet in the past few years, these are issues on which some have wanted NATO to take the lead. (See “Hybrid Warfare” in Section Six for more information how NATO should deal with hybrid threats.)

### Link: Terrorism Missions

#### NATO poorly equipped to deal with terror threats—should focus on Russian threats not expanded terror mission

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 13-14]

NATO and Counterterrorism. The Arab Spring failed to usher in an era of democratic reforms for which many Western policymakers were naively hoping. Nine years on, the civil wars in Libya and Syria have become a breeding ground for non-state extremist groups. Islamists groups, such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and ISIS, and non-Islamist terrorist-linked groups, such as the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in northern Syria, have flourished in the ensuing chaos. Much of the same can be said about Libya, too.

Islamist terrorism has plagued Europe since 2014. As Heritage research has shown: “In Western Europe, there has been a steady pace of ISIS-inspired and ISIS-directed terrorist attacks over the past five years. In total, 1,749 people were injured and 371 were killed in Islamist plots between January 2014 and June 2019.”23

In the United States, there have been more than 100 Islamist-inspired plots or attacks since 9/11.24 It is only natural that the citizens of NATO members want more to be done to fight terrorism. This desire is reflected in President Donald Trump’s rhetoric. He has used his presidency to trumpet the idea that NATO should be re-tooled into a counterterrorism force.25 However important the issue of terrorism is, calls for NATO to be re-tooled to focus first and foremost on counterterrorism operations are misguided for a number of reasons:

\* NATO was never designed as or meant to be a counterterrorism force. Although terrorism did exist at the time of the Alliance’s founding in 1949, the architects of NATO focused the Alliance on territorial defense for good reason.

\* NATO lacks the required tools for counterterrorism operations. NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance. NATO does not possess legislative powers to confront terrorism, nor does it have the ability to implement sanctions and block terrorist funding. It also lacks many other capabilities required to fight terrorism, such as policy competency over law enforcement and border and immigration control.

\* While terrorism poses a major threat to NATO members, it is not existential in the same way as a nuclear-armed and aggressive Russia.

NATO’s focus on territorial defense instead of counterterrorism does not mean that the members inside NATO should not be working together on counterterrorism operations—but NATO as an institution should not be the leader or main actor in these operations. Instead, if a military operation is required to fight terrorism, it should be led by a coalition of the willing, formed and led by NATO members, but not by NATO itself.

# Internal Links: War [.9K]

### Internal: China-Russia Emboldenment

#### NATO’s effectiveness deepends on the U.S.’s ability to push it to focus on collective defense—necessary to check Russia and China

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 3]

During this reflection period, the U.S. must demonstrate leadership. NATO needs to refocus on its raison d’être on collective defense. The U.S. needs to lead the Alliance back to basics, and focus the Alliance on its eastern flank where the threat from Russia remains the number one challenge. The U.S. needs to also ensure that NATO remains fully capable of collective defense with robust defense spending and capabilities in areas including cyber warfare and information warfare. At the same time that it is focusing on basics, NATO must be capable of addressing a range of growing challenges, from China to transnational terrorism, without losing sight of the Alliance’s competencies and purpose. Getting this balance right requires an understanding of where the Alliance has been, where it is, and where it is going. This Special Report will provide vital guideposts for striking the proper balance, and ensuring the vitality of NATO for the next 70 years and beyond.

#### Russia and China emboldened by expanded policy agenda

Moller & Rynning, Seton Hall & University of Southern Denmark Professors, ‘21

[Sara Fjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University and Sten Rynning, Professor, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 44 n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 186-187]

A focused (narrow and deep) approach to a renewed Strategic Concept would serve NATO better than a broadened agenda because it highlights what NATO does best—collective defense—and in a complex security environment, it forces decision-makers to think through the defense implications of political choices like enlargement. NATO can and should address any theme and any geography that impacts its collective defense interests and capacity; it should avoid chasing alliance legitimacy and relevance by labeling a range of national security issues as “core tasks.” Continuing to go wide will bring NATO into conflict with the range of domestic reforms as well as the political0economic rationale of a strengthened EU.

Russia and China are the two strategic actors that have a capacity to break NATO by strategies of coercion. NATO allies, by fighting long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and intervening in Libya and Syria, have offered these competitors ample opportunity to adapt to Western military strengths and political weaknesses.29 Were NATO to label these countries threats and challenges, which it has, and then wander off in many policy directions, which it may, it would embolden these competitors further and erode NATO’s own resolve and reputation. This challenge lies at the heart of a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

As authors, we cannot pretend to offer a full roadmap for such a new Strategic Concept; however, we can sketch some of the key issues to which decisionmakers should pay particular attention, as well as pitfalls they should avoid. Below we offer an outline of how NATO can best position itself for a slimmer, collective defense-focused Strategic Concept, organized around the central tenets of the alliance’s founding document—the Washington Treaty

### Internal: Great Power Competition

#### NATO needs to focus on great power competition—cannot deal with other missions

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks.

Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.”

The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit.

# Impact: China

### China Internal: NATO Key—2NC

#### NATO overstretch threatens its ability to manage China’s rise

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘21

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “China’s Rise Is Exactly the Kind of Threat NATO Exists to Stop,” WASHINGTON POST, 3—12—21, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/chinas-rise-is-exactly-the-kind-of-threat-nato-exists-to-stop/2021/03/11/c3adfad6-8211-11eb-81db-b02f0398f49a_story.html>, accessed 6-8-22]

With Trump gone, the alliance can’t simply go back to business as usual — because for some time now business as usual in NATO has meant taking on more and more roles and activities in a frantic quest for relevance. And while Trump absolutely damaged the alliance, it would be foolhardy to blame all of its problems on him: Mission drift, for instance, long predated his administration. A longer-term corrective may involve reorienting the security organization’s focus toward its traditional role of deterring and defending against strategic competitors: Russia, yes, but even more so China. That nation is the obvious successor to the mid-20th-century Soviet Union in harboring global ideological aspirations at odds with those of the major Western democracies

The end of the Cold War understandably precipitated NATO’s identity crisis. With U.S. guidance, the organization pivoted away from its longtime focus on collective defense against Moscow — an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all — toward a global peace-enforcement role. The security of nations outside the alliance became a concern on the theory that instability and violence beyond NATO’s borders could spill over onto alliance territory, and because intervention to stop humanitarian catastrophes was seen as inherently right. (In the 1990s, then-Sen. Richard Lugar famously declared that the alliance must go “out of area” lest it risk going “out of business.”) This shift was accompanied by expansion: Since the late ’90s, NATO has nearly doubled its membership, from 16 to 30, incorporating states that were once part of the Soviet Union, like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, or members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, like Poland.

Early examples of NATO’s new role included the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 to halt violence against Kosovar civilians perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic’s regime, followed by peacekeeping duties there. In 2003, NATO took on the task of enforcing peace in Afghanistan after the invasion by a U.S.-led coalition. In 2011, it intervened in Libya to impose a U.N. Security Council cease-fire resolution on the Moammar Gaddafi regime.

Civil strife and violence in these and other hotspots are unlikely to recede anytime soon, but NATO is ill equipped to fix such problems. Worldwide crisis stabilization is too open-ended a goal to serve as the organizing principle for a military alliance — and such ambitions stretch valuable NATO resources at a time when threats to the North Atlantic region are growing. Refocusing NATO to check the dangers posed by China’s rise would restore it to something closer to its original mission of safeguarding allies from strategic competitors.

#### Aff’s prioritization away from collective security issues reduces capacity to deal with China’s rise

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

Instead of seeking to tackle every new security challenge of the 21st century, NATO leaders should work to preserve NATO’s core assets and capabilities for the task that it is uniquely suited for: deterring state-based adversaries and defending the territorial integrity of its members. The time when NATO could be both a collective defense and a collective security organization has passed. Amid the reemergence of great-power rivalries, it no longer makes sense to assign NATO’s limited resources to naval operations in support of the refugee crisis as the organization did back in 2016. Or for the alliance to continue to try its hand at stabilizing war-torn nations.

NATO has survived this long by adapting. But unlike in the past, where NATO adaptation has always meant taking on more responsibilities, the reforms needed today are those that involve shedding commitments rather than taking on additional ones. In seeking to reestablish NATO once again as an alliance focused solely on collective defense, and not a collective security organization, the Biden team will need to resist the urge to pick up the phone and call NATO Headquarters whenever a new security challenge emerges, like previous U.S. presidents have done since the end of the Cold War.

Jettisoning the collective security responsibilities the NATO alliance has assumed over the past three decades won’t be easy. Nor does freeing NATO from responsibility for tackling issues like counter-terrorism and instability in the near abroad mean that such threats are not deserving of international cooperative efforts by states. It simply means that going forward, countries committed to these kinds of activities will have to look to organizations and venues other than NATO to address them.

Rather than expend precious resources and continue to use NATO as an instrument to grapple with all manner of cooperative security issues, a Biden administration should instead reorient the alliance’s strategic focus toward the more pressing task of adjusting to China’s rise. Not doing so risks turning NATO into nothing more than a glorified discussion club. To avoid this fate, the Biden team will have to move quickly. At stake is not just alliance unity but NATO’s future utility.

### China Internal: NATO Key—Command Structure

#### NATO integrated military command structures key to territorial defense and countering China – must narrow focus to command structure

Moller, Seton Hall Assistant Professor, ‘20

[Sara Bjerg Moller, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, “It Will Take More than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 9—25—20, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/>, accessed 6-9-22]

Much like the 1990s, the coming decade will be one of transition for NATO. Back then, proponents of alliance reform argued that the only way forward was to enlarge the alliance and take on new responsibilities. Without such reforms, they claimed, NATO would disappear. The choice facing NATO members today is different: not a world without NATO, but a world in which NATO fails to fulfill its intended purpose. Preparing NATO for China’s rise does not mean sending alliance-flagged vessels to the South China Sea. But the reality is, as Stoltenberg put it last December, China is already “coming closer to us.”

Ultimately, NATO possesses few capabilities of its own. Individual allies — and not the alliance itself — retain ownership and control over the military material and personnel assigned to NATO operations and missions. The alliance’s real strength, however, lies in its integrated military command structure. Preserving and protecting the integrated command structure’s organizational bandwidth should be the primary focus in the coming years. Unloading the alliance’s collective security responsibilities onto other international actors would allow alliance military officials to focus on the challenges emanating from China (and, to a far lesser degree, Russia) free of the need to also tackle a host of lower-threshold security concerns, all of which require office space, funding, and personnel billets. Bifurcating collective security tasks from collective defense would also force European leaders once and for all to decide exactly what price they are willing to pay for their own national defense.

### China Internal: NATO Key—Power Projection

#### Effective NATO required to leverage resources to frustrate Chinese logistics needed for global expansion

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Frustrating China’s efforts in the “far seas”

A second major role of the Atlantic alliance would be to contribute to frustrating China’s ambitions to expand its geostrategic reach in the “far seas.” At present, the debate about NATO’s new “global role” focuses predominantly on increasing its role in Indo-Pacific. The aforementioned 2020 expert group on NATO’s future, for instance, recommended that in response to China’s rise, the alliance had to “leverage its strong partnerships not only in NATO’s neighborhood but further afield in the Indo-Pacific in an era of intensifying geostrategic competition and global threats.”66 Others have also advocated a permanent presence of NATO in the Indo-Pacific.67

To be sure, closer NATO relationships with Indo-Pacific players such as Australia, Japan, India and Mongolia will add to add to the alliance’s understanding about China’s strategic behavior in the Indo-Pacific, given their geostrategic location and ambition to push back against Beijing’s assertiveness. Moreover, enhanced political and practical cooperation with these nations sends a welcomed signal to the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies that NATO is prepared to play a greater role. That said, the main effort to China’s unfavorable geostrategic situation in its “near seas” will be carried by the U.S. and its regional allies and partners. There, China is already confronted with an “oppos- ing configuration of powers organized around the U.S.-led alliance system.”68 Moreover, NATO officials have stressed that major European allies such as Germany and France remain reluctant to utilize the alliance in a posture which is too openly postured against China in the Indo-Pacific.69 Presumably that is partly why NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has publicly excluded a NATO presence in the Western Pacific.70 However, the broader geostrategic task for the U.S. and its allies is to establish a new geostrategic framework to also make “the far seas a more inhospitable environment for China’s expeditionary forces and overseas bases.”71 This is where NATO comes in. The Atlantic alliance could play a significant role in complicating the PLA’s expanded global reach. First, a major Achilles heel of China’s global ambitions is its lack of overseas logistical infrastructure, such as access to bases and other facilities.72 Moving forward, NATO could not only seek to frustrate China’s efforts to develop its critical logistics infrastructure in Europe, but also utilize its existing partnerships in Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region to work toward a similar outcome. In conjunction with the European Union (EU), the alliance could also complicate Chinese efforts to develop critical military logistics nodes in Central Asia and Eastern Europe in efforts to “preventing China from realizing its strategy of building an autonomous supply chain across the continental Heartland.”73

#### Chinese naval power key to power projection – and US and NATO naval power necessary to limit Chinese regional hegemony

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

The third geostrategist of relevance for this discussion is U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) who argued for the preeminent importance of great powers’ ability to project sea power.31 U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been based on its predominant sea power in the region which allowed it to prevent any possible major challenger, including China, from contesting the East Asian “rimland.” In the face of China’s growing power – which has turned the Middle Kingdom from a continental into hybrid land-sea power32 – Mahanian ideas have become more important for the

U.S. and its Asian and European allies. For U.S. military strategy, sea power becomes ever more important to deny Beijing the ability to dominate the Asian maritime periphery.33 Japan, one of America’s key ally in responding to China’s challenge, is also moving gradually toward shoring up its sea power.34 Finally, given China’s ability to project significant military power into the Indo-Pacific and beyond will predominantly depend on its ability to project and sustain naval power, for European states the mar- itime domain will also be crucial in terms of NATO’s response.

#### NATO naval and air power supremacy plus integrated military command limits PLA operations – empirics prove necessary to check Chinese rise

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Likewise, NATO is well-positioned to contest Chinese efforts to establish control in the Mediterranean and other critical maritime spaces China’s “near seas.” Combined NATO naval and associated air forces would be able to presents a formidable obstacle to PLA operations in the Mediterranean, the adjacent Black Sea, as well as critical maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Allied forces could be integrated into the increased presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet77 operating out of Naples in Italy – also home to NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command. NATO has already boosted its naval presence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.78 While at present, these increased activities are primarily in response to Russia, in the future they could more systematically focus on China as well. Lastly, for NATO to adequately respond to a globalized PLA the alliance could begin to work on related operational concepts, wargaming and the like – something it is well-equipped given its history in doing so successfully against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its integrated military command.

#### Effective NATO fosters Chinese overstretch needed to limit global rise

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Conclusion

Classical geopolitical theories provided by Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan have sig- nificant relevance for understanding NATO’s geopolitical and geostrategic challenge when it comes to China. A combination of Mackinder and Spykman suggests that the Atlantic Alliance should perceive China’s rise as primarily a challenge to the Eurasian maritime periphery. In response, Mahan’s idea about the central importance of the maritime commons should be a guiding principle for NATO’s response to China. Perceived in such a way, the article demonstrate that NATO could make a significant contribution to putting pressure on China in regards to its continental direction and its ability to extend its reach in the “far seas.” The United States and its European allies can utilize their geostrategic location to frustrate Chinese efforts to establish spheres of influence in the Eurasian maritime periphery. Geopolitically, such a NATO approach would foster a transatlantic vision on how to deal with China’s challenge to the “rimland” and force China to spend diplomatic and strategic resources on both the Eurasian landmass and the Indo-Pacific oceans, contributing to Beijing’s challenge of “strategic overstretch” that Chinese analysts worry about.79

Obviously, geography does not predetermine political outcomes and scholars of classical geopolitics warn against narrow geographical determinism in predicting the foreign and security policy of nations.80 Just because China’s geopolitical rise should compel a specific NATO response, does not mean its political leaders will act accord- ingly. That said, the Atlantic alliance has proven remarkably flexible and able to adjust to changing geostrategic environments. As China’s rise gradually encroaches on Euro-Atlantic geographical spaces, it is not unreasonable to expect NATO playing an increased role in contesting Beijing’s global ambition and reach.

### China Internal: NATO Key—U.S. Prioritization / Resources

#### Strong NATO allows US to prioritize China threat – and sustained support means threats of US abandonment not reality

Webber, Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham and the 2022/23 Senior Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College, 2022

[Mark “Extending NATO: retirement plan not required” NATO Review 04 April 2022 [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html accessed 6.16.2022](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/04/04/extending-nato-retirement-plan-not-required/index.html%20accessed%206.16.2022) GDI-TM]

There is no substitute

NATO’s uniqueness means, by definition, it cannot be substituted. NATO’s transatlantic character along with the military and political features described above exist in combination nowhere else. The UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the EU can all lay claim to promoting security in one way or another, but none would have been able to mount the sorts of operations NATO has undertaken in the Balkans, Libya and Afghanistan. Similarly, the Readiness Action Plan adopted after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the reinforcement of the eastern flank in 2022, could only have been achieved by NATO. The same, of course, can be said for how Europe’s defence was organised during the Cold War.

Proposed alternatives to NATO have been few and fleeting. Abandonment – the course entertained by President Trump - is the most dramatic and consequential. Many worry that a future American president may still invoke this option, although there is every possibility it would still fall foul of the constitutional need for Senate affirmation. As for the current administration, it has returned policy to the mainstream. The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance describes NATO as one of ‘America’s greatest strategic asset(s).’ The reasons why are obvious. NATO doesn’t simply entrench American influence in Europe. It also helps furnish a reliable pool of interoperable armed forces and keeps the peace at one end of the Eurasian landmass, so allowing the US (the Ukraine crisis notwithstanding) to prioritise the threat from China at the other. Even Trump came to recognise these virtues. Tellingly, he never actually acted upon what now appear impetuous and ambiguous threats to withdraw from the Alliance. And in material terms, American support for the NATO Allies (evident in the European Deterrence Initiative) actually increased during the Trump years.

#### US strategic threat calculations require resource allocation towards China – require NATO burden sharing

Keil, Senior Fellow, Security and Defense Policy GMF, 2022

[Steven, German Marshall Fund - non-partisan policy organization studying transatlantic interests “NATO Core Tasks in a Contested Global Landscape” German Marshall Fund February 11, 2022 [https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape GDI-TM 6.16.2022](https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape%20GDI-TM%206.16.2022)]

But beyond the increased primacy of China in US national security, US foreign policy also faces a multifaceted challenge at home. Defense spending will likely be under increased pressure in the coming years, with some former US officials arguing that a flat defense budget may be the best-case scenario. Moreover, allocations within the budget will also increasingly focus on countering China. When the Pentagon released its budget request for 2022, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said that “the department in this budget takes a clear-eyed approach to Beijing and provides the investments to prioritize China as our pacing challenge.” The pressure from China’s military investments in the coming years will only further necessitate a closer focus of US resource allocation to counter it. NATO must take this trend and pressure on US policy seriously. Here, conversations about burden sharing will take on added importance. A continued push for a fairer burden sharing has broad support in the US Congress. There may be divergence over the proper metrics, but few would argue that the outsized contributions of the United States in all aspects of alliance activity are fair.

This reality becomes particularly problematic when combined with forces of US politics that are either more naturally inclined toward retrenchment or more skeptical of Europe or alliances in general. There is worrying space for the United States to eschew more common approaches to the Euro-Atlantic allies and partners. Case in point was the Trump administration, which took an overtly aggressive and at times hostile tone with some of the United States’ longest-standing and closest allies. It was also reported that President Donald Trump floated the idea of withdrawing from NATO on multiple occasions. These political sentiments put significant pressure on the US posture in Europe, with the Trump administration announcing it would cut US forces in Germany by one-third, with half of those troops returning to the United States. While never actually implemented and ultimately reversed by the Biden administration, this decision reinforced the confluence of burden-sharing problems and domestic political dynamics on US foreign policy engagement with allies in ways that had been previously unlikely.

It is clear that as the United States focuses more on China, it will ask Europe to do more in and around Europe. Coming to terms with the challenges facing US foreign policy will be critical for its partners and allies. Europe must do more to shoulder the burden at home, which has direct implications for NATO deterrence and collective defense. Political and economic dynamics in the United States only add a need for NATO allies and partners to rethink the role they can play in shoring up the alliance’s collective commitments in the current strategic environment. This includes contributions to collective defense. Russia’s pressure on the alliance and key partners is unlikely to subside. In this space, added European capability will be critical and ongoing conversations around a greater European ambition or European strategic autonomy could prove useful if properly seized and leveraged by NATO.

#### NATO should focus on checking Chinese activities with Russia and in the far seas

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

A geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China strategy

How should NATO respond geostrategically to China? A good point of departure is the observation by Yoshihara and Bianchi that in the context of a globalizing PLA, U.S. and allied strategy should focus on exploiting China’s geostrategic weaknesses in three geographic dimensions: (1) its continental direction, specifically as it relates to Beijing’s relationships with the other two major Eurasian land power, Russia and India; (2) its “near seas,” specifically the waters and the rimland within the “first island chain” of the Western Pacific; and (3) the “far seas,” i.e., the oceanic spaces beyond the Western Pacific.54 It appears that NATO is bests suited to make a contribution to the first and third geographical dimension.

Putting stress on China’s continental direction

As a “composite land-sea power,” China faces the difficult geostrategic challenge of being strong in the maritime and continental directions simultaneously over long-periods. Beijing thus faces the perennial risk of being squeezed by hostile land powers and on its seaward flanks, and therefore must devote resources in both directions – a dilemma identified by Chinese strategists.55

For NATO, this provides an opening to contribute to an allied strategy to exerting pressure on China’s continental direction in two ways. The first regards its relationship with Russia. The geopolitical “worst case” for the Atlantic Alliance would be a unified Sino-Russian geostrategy to jointly expand their control over the Eurasian landmass and rimland, thereby inevitably intensifying pressure on NATO’s Eastern European allies, its Southern flank and Euro-Atlantic maritime spaces. Some scholars have there- fore called for a new geopolitical deal between Washington and Moscow to balance against Beijing, where the United States would partially decouple from European security to focus on China.56 In such a “Nixon Doctrine for Europe,” the U.S. could “conceivably partner with Russia in a strategic alliance to balance against the Middle Kingdom.”57

However, any such development would be detrimental for NATO’s cohesion since a reduced U.S. strategic engagement in Europe would be seen by European NATO allies as a sign of weakened America commitment to Euro-Atlantic defense. Moreover, a transatlantic geographical separation of strategic foci into Europe (Europe-NATO) and Indo-Pacific (U.S.) is neither in Europe’s nor America’s interest. As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, a “United States, separated from Europe would become, geopolitically, an island off the shores of Eurasia resembling nineteenth-century Britain vis-à-vis Europe.”58 Therefore, calls for a reduced U.S. strategic engagement in Europe to “free up” resources to contain China in the Western Pacific are as negligent of geopolitical realities than are voices insisting that China’s rise is purely an American problem and that NATO should stay clear off any related geostrategic engagement. Instead, adhering to the geopolitical thought of Mackinder and Spykman, NATO’s China approach would be best served by an understanding that U.S. “offshore balancing” toward the European “rimland” would be counterproductive. As Colin Gray noted, historically U.S. decision-makers have understood Spykman’s emphasis that in order to “balance power in Eurasia it was essential for the United States to balance there ‘on-shore’.”59 And it is precisely because of the rise of China, that NATO-Europe retains its importance as a key “pivot” in a new geopolitical dynamic.60 As a result, a better option would be for NATO to provide a robust deterrence against Russia while at the same time closely monitor Sino-Russian activities in the Arctic and the High North and Central Asia. Arguably, further China encroaches into what Russia perceives at its sphere of influ- ence, for instance in the Artic and parts of Eastern Europe, “classic geopolitical con- cerns” that “lurk beneath the surface” of Sino-Russian relations are likely to come to the fore.61 This would in turn put pressure on China to guard against an increasingly uneasy strategic relationship with Russia.

#### NATO division of labor key to free up US assets to deal with China

Haroche and Quencez, 2022

[Pierre Haroche Research Fellow in European Security at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris) & Martin Quencez, Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States“NATO Facing China: Responses and Adaptations” Survival 64:3, 73-86, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2078047 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

The question of how NATO should respond to Chinese power was a mar- ginal one until the United States brought the issue to the forefront in early 2019. The Alliance’s December 2019 London Declaration observed that Chinese power presents ‘both opportunities and challenges’, and its June 2021 Brussels communiqué detailed these challenges, along with opportu- nities for dialogue.1 The new Strategic Concept to be presented in June 2022 at the Madrid Summit should also elaborate on the China question. This article explores the various options open to NATO as it seeks to devise a China policy, both in the run-up to the publication of its new Strategic Concept and over the longer term. These options highlight differences in the European and American visions, as well as ways that a balance might be achieved between the allies’ priorities. In preparing this article, the authors conducted confidential interviews between June and December 2021 with ten representatives of NATO member states, four NATO officials and two experts. Military approaches A common argument concerning NATO’s relationship with China is that the Alliance is ill-equipped to deal with the Chinese challenge because Europeans can only make a small contribution to the US military effort in East Asia.2 At most, NATO could orchestrate a sort of ‘division of labour’ between Europeans and the US, allowing the latter to focus more on Asia.3 Given Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the consequent need for NATO to concentrate heavily on Russia’s revanchist threat, this stance may seem superficially attractive. The maximalist option would be for NATO to explic- itly identify China as a ‘threat’ to Europe, along with Russia and terrorism, and to modify its military plans accordingly.4

### China Impact: Arctic—1NC

#### NATO key to limit Chinese Arctic gains

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Second, NATO is well placed to meet China and its growing geostrategic ambitions in the Artic and the High North. Given close geographic proximity, the interests of several European NATO allies such as Norway, Denmark and the UK are directly engaged. As the new Artic strategy of the U.S. Army of January 2021 makes clear, the American military will increase its capabilities to meet China’s (and Russia’s) growing geostrategic challenge in that region.74 NATO has been closely monitoring China’s activities in the Artic. There is also evidence that given renewed U.S. leadership in the Artic, as well as the pressures by China and Russia, the Atlantic Alliance has moved to abandon its heretofore cautious approach toward the Arctic. For instance, the major Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018 focused on a scenario to reinforce Norway and included High North elements. The establishment of the new NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) in Norfolk in 2020 includes a focus on readiness and preparedness for High North contingencies.75 Moreover, in October NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) established a new operational coordination arrangement with the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO) to strengthen its role in the Arctic.76 NATO is thus in a good position to prevent China from establishing an Arctic sphere of influence, should Beijing expand its activities.

#### Chinese Russia ties reduce European security, increase Chinese hegemony in the Arctic and reduce international rules based order

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Moreover, China seeks to expand its strategic reach in the northern part of the Eurasian maritime periphery. Beijing is a long-term trajectory to establish itself as a great power in the High North and the Arctic – including through a future military presence by developing (amongst other capabilities) nuclear-powered icebreakers.45 Its 2018 Arctic Policy asserted that geographically China was a “Near Arctic” state, a clear reference to geopolitical ambition.46 Beijing, therefore, not only focused on increasing its economic and logistical leverage in geostrategically important places such as Iceland and Greenland. Moreover, highly troubling for NATO, it also attempted to by a defunct naval base in Greenland – complete with a port suitable for surface ships or even submarines – and build a new or refurbish the airport outside the capital Nuuk, as well as two other airfields. NATO ally Denmark was quick to reject the naval base acquisition, but it reportedly took U.S. intervention to urge Copenhagen to also repel China’s airfield investment.47

To secure greater access to the Euro-Atlantic part of the “Eurasian maritime periph- ery,” good strategic ties with Russia are essential for China. In this context, the evolution of much closer Sino-Russian ties has been one of the most important recent geopolitical developments in Eurasia and reflect Mackinder’s prediction about the potential emergence of China’s gradual hegemony in large parts of the Eurasian land- mass.48 China has been skilled in exploiting its much-improved strategic relations with Russia to make inroads into the Euro-Atlantic area. Sino-Russian relations under Presidents Xi and Vladimir Putin have moved beyond mere “convenience” and are now grounded in a mutual objective to jointly erode the U.S.-led Western order and to expand their respective spheres of influence. For Beijing, Moscow is an increasingly useful partner to fulfill its global power ambition, specifically in Eurasia and its adja- cent areas.49

### China Impact: Arctic—Threatens NATO / Europe

#### China Polar Silk Road initiative threatens US and NATO security

Hargraves, et al 2021

[MAJ Drew Hargraves, MAJ Timothy Chess, and Lt Col Armin Blueggel “A Crowded North: NATO Considerations for China's Arctic Ambition” Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College October 28 2021 Google Scholar – UT accessed 6.17.2022 GDI-TM]

Captured in the 2018 National Defense strategy, the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” has reentered the public dialogue as the preeminent national security concern.1 Within the U.S. Defense enterprise, the assertion drives a perspective on potential competitors and their impacts on U.S. and Allied strategic objectives. One of the competitors, China and its Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and subsequent plan in the Arctic, the Polar Silk Road (PSR), potentially threatens the security of the U.S. and its preeminent alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Captured in a 2010 strategic concept, NATO’s core tasks include: safeguarding the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means; promoting a community committed to the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; and preserving and promoting the transatlantic link to maintain Euro-Atlantic security.2 The document also defines its approach to security as the collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security mandates.3 The document directs NATO to discuss issues of territorial integrity and political independence.4 Finally, the alliance calls on the continued modernization and transformation efforts to maintain NATO as an effective body.5 Despite NATO’s collective defense treaty, China could exploit the Alliance’s gaps through bilateral economic agreements, engaging those pro-NATO, but non- members in Europe, and executing calculated actions that would fail to garner the unanimous thirty-member vote required for an official response. Concerningly, China has a history of operating with significant disregard for global legal frameworks vis-à-vis military coercion in the South China Sea (SCS) and predatory lending practices in Africa.6 China’s behavior merits examination using factor analysis to understand the implications of China’s expansion into NATO’s area of responsibility (AOR). As a self-declared “near-Arctic State,” China continues to increase its political, economic, and physical influence in the Arctic Region; its activities directly impact the eight Arctic nations, five of which are NATO members: Canada, the United States, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark.7 Examination of China’s influence and methods in the SCS, Africa, and in the Arctic within the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) framework provides valuable examples and indicators as to future Chinese actions in the Arctic. The analysis suggests that China may exploit its bi-lateral relationships with NATO Alliance members purposefully or inadvertently undermine NATO security interests in the region. China may also look to fill seams between both NATO members and enhanced partners (Finland and Sweden), using economic and diplomatic influence to shape their relationship with NATO. More broadly, China’s increased presence in the Arctic Region can generally be viewed as an extension of actions in other geographical domains and may indicate the effects the PSR may have on NATO’s security.

#### China Russia military exercises and ties expand Chinese power relative to NATO sphere of influence – undermines security

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

China has also used its closer military ties with Russia to increase its presence in the Eurasian maritime periphery. For example, in 2015 and 2017, the PLA Navy (PLAN) exercised with Russian forces in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea. Its 2017 exercise in the Mediterranean included live-fire drills. While the PLAN’s access to overseas bases and logistics hubs is still relatively rudimentary at present, a 2020 Pentagon report noted that over the next decade its global logistical access closer to the Euro-Atlantic area is likely to increase50 The PLA’s global power projection capa- bilities are certain to increase over the coming decades, with repercussions for the Euro-Atlantic maritime rimland periphery. Analysts point out that China has already made moves toward establishing itself as a naval power in the South Atlantic.51 A similar scenario for the North Atlantic cannot be excluded and thus NATO’s future dominance in the “three inner seas – the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea – should not be taken for granted.”52 Therefore, the geopolitical principles set out by Mackinder and Spykman suggest that China is gradually turning into a challenge for NATO in the “Eurasian maritime periphery.”53

### China Impact: Arctic—A2 “No Chinese Presence”

#### Yes – Chinese escalation in Arctic to protect resources access

Hargraves, et al 2021

[MAJ Drew Hargraves, MAJ Timothy Chess, and Lt Col Armin Blueggel “A Crowded North: NATO Considerations for China's Arctic Ambition” Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College October 28 2021 Google Scholar – UT accessed 6.17.2022 GDI-TM]

While the potential exists for Chinese military actions in support of the BRI in the Arctic or the PSR, there are few historical precedents. The only physical presence made by the PLA was a 2015 trip to the Bering Sea after completing military exercises with the Russian Navy.40 Despite the minimal PLA presence, China’s increasing military partnership with Russia provides them a supporting presence in the Arctic. In the long-term, the Chinese strategy suggests that if Arctic resources and shipping routes provide a significant contribution to the Chinese economy and are under threat, they will deploy forces to protect the assets.41 As the Chinese pursue diplomatic and economic objectives in the Arctic, the potential for Chinese military activity in the region increases if the CCP determines threats to national priorities.

#### Arctic economic strategy to shore up economy to avoid regime change

Hargraves, et al 2021

[MAJ Drew Hargraves, MAJ Timothy Chess, and Lt Col Armin Blueggel “A Crowded North: NATO Considerations for China's Arctic Ambition” Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College October 28 2021 Google Scholar – UT accessed 6.17.2022 GDI-TM]

China’s incessant need to control economic corridors and hoard resources is a manifestation of their deep-seated anxieties.55 The ruling party fears an economic slowdown resulting from supply disruptions or material shortages could lead to civil unrest and eventual regime change.56 To mitigate the single point of failure and secure its vital interests, China turned its attention towards the North Sea Route, the third leg of its belt and road initiative.57

Since 2003, China has invested nearly $90 billion into the Arctic region with the acquisition of two polar-capable ice breakers and infrastructure development from Canada to Siberia.58 The alternate corridor has significant advantages over the Strait of Malacca by reducing shipping time by 22% and lowering transportation costs by as much as $127 billion dollars.59 Another significant advantage to an Arctic route is Chinese shipments would transit more secure waterways instead of traversing pirate-infested waters off the coast of Somalia or around unstable countries whose internal instability could impact maritime activity.

Chinese economic strategy for the Arctic is more ambitious than simply accessing maritime corridors. China’s government-controlled corporations have aggressively used instruments of national power to secure lucrative economic arrangements within the non-NATO Arctic nations of Sweden and Finland. Chinese firms have bought large interests of Swedish corporations and used their influence to attempt acquisitions of military and civilian infrastructure. The latest such attempt involved a proposal to construct and manage a deep-water port to secure their footprint.60 To date, Sweden has blocked the Chinese expansionist activities, but Chinese diplomatic efforts have aimed at reversing Swedish policy, illuminating their strategic intent for the Arctic.61 Within Finland, Chinese firms have relied heavily on an amalgamation of diplomatic activities to exert the leverage needed to increase economic access. Successful corporate partnerships with local business owners and politicians have enabled China to solidify its economic access within the relatively small but strategically important country. The arrangements have become increasingly transparent as CCP umbrella corporations throughout Finland make the population dependent on Chinese trade and susceptible to its political manipulation.62

### China Impact: Liberal Order—1NC

#### An uncontained China threatens the liberal order—it is an existential threat

Bishara, former American University of Paris professor, ‘21

[Marwan Bishara, Senior Political Analyst, Al Jazeera, and former Professor, International Relations, American University of Paris, “China’s Rise and America’s Decline Spell Conflict,” AL JAZEERA, 11—18—21, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/11/18/the-chinese-miracle-and-the-american-debacle>, accessed 6-12-22]

But the similarities are becoming uncanny as a rising China begins to pose a strategic challenge to the global system similar to that of the Soviet Union; as Biden frames the conflict between the US and China in ideological terms (a clash between democracy and autocracy); and as both sides show a willingness to resort to all means necessary to achieve their goals short of a large military confrontation, or a destructive “hot war”.

China has certainly pulled ahead of Russia, which is trying to revive its old glory and influence by any means necessary. President Vladimir Putin may play dirty games with the West, but Xi is adamant about rewriting the rules of the game altogether.

China’s strongman rejects the “international rules-based order” the West dictates and insists on co-authoring the principles of a new world order.

In other words, the US may downplay Moscow’s provocations as the desperate manoeuvres of a “regional power”, but when it comes to Beijing, it has no choice but to pay attention to this bullish and bullying superpower.

China has succeeded where it counts, where the Soviet Union had failed – the economy. China’s economy has expanded at an incredible rate and, all things being equal, is destined to surpass that of the US in this decade.

China is also developing a strategic doctrine and posture worthy of its economic supremacy, and which includes conventional, naval, digital, space and nuclear military power.

There are many ways to quantify the Chinese miracle, no less in comparison with the US. But it suffices for our purpose here to take an overall look at the century since the US emerged as a world power and the Chinese Communist Party was first established, in 1921.

In its first half, China suffered from turmoil, disintegration, foreign occupation and horrific famine that killed tens of millions, while the US became a world superpower, comprising 40 to 50 percent of the world economy.

China began to get its act together during the past 50 years, which coincided with the US’s recognition of the communist government and the late President Richard Nixon’s historical visit in 1972, the first by a US president. But it was not until 10 years later that China began to widely liberalise and industrialise its economy at a breathtaking pace.

Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2001, has propelled China to global prominence as the “world’s factory”. In the following 20 years, the Chinese economy skyrocketed from the equivalent of 13 percent of the US economy to 73 percent this year; a five-fold increase. In the process, it pulled hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty.

Furthermore, Xi’s 2013 multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), spanning more than 60 countries, has ensured China’s strategic enlargement and geopolitical expansion like never before. Interestingly, renewable energy investments reached a new high of 57 percent of BRI’s total for energy projects in 2020.

The US may have hoped that China’s membership would mean cheap imported goods and the moderation and democratisation of the Chinese government, but eventually, China’s ascension led to a $300bn annual trade deficit and the communist party tightened its grip on power, alas.

As the China miracle unfolded, US power has continued to unravel over the past 20 years, beginning with the debacles of its wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the greater Middle East and through the 2008 financial crisis and the disastrous Trump presidency, as Washington lost lots of assets, credibility, and influence among friends and foes alike around the world.

In the process, the US’s share of the world economy shrank by almost half to 22 percent.

That is why Biden, who urged Xi not to let their competition veer into conflict, must tread carefully after the summit ends to ensure the US has the necessary geopolitical clout to deter a bellicose China from making any aggressive moves in Asia and beyond.

Likewise, it is incumbent on the Chinese leader, who is feeling super-confident nowadays, to refrain from resorting to unsavoury means or unnecessary threats that could escalate into a large confrontation with dangerous consequences.

The world’s wellbeing, indeed its survival, depends on it.

### China Impact: Liberal Order—Internal

#### China rise threatens US leadership and rules based order

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Introduction

How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respond to China’s rise? This issue is becoming increasingly relevant for the transatlantic security community. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has become increasingly assertive and is working toward achieving the “China Dream” of becoming a global superpower by 2050, including through building a “world-class military.” A centerpiece of this grand strategy has been to expand China’s global reach through erosion of the Western “rules-based order” and contestation of the “Pax Americana” in East Asia and more globally. Consequently, geopolitics and great power rivalry have made a comeback in the form of a comprehensive U.S.-Sino strategic competition for global influence.1 In this context, the United States (U.S.) has expressed expectations for NATO allies to join its efforts to push back against China. For instance, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis argued in February 2017 that the future value of the transatlantic security community depended on NATO’s ability to address “a more assertive China.”2 The new U.S. administration of President Joseph Biden also announced in 2021 that strategic competition with China as America’s “most serious competitor” would con- tinue.3 The Biden team reportedly expected European allies to shoulder some of the burden in managing China.4

At the heart of NATO’s China challenge is the need to grasp the common geopo- litical challenge posed by Beijing to the Euro-Atlantic security. As Danish strategist Sten Rynning has pointed out, for NATO to respond effectively the alliance would need to recognize its own “geopolitical character” and understand that China’s rise “to international pre-eminence is the defining feature along the East-West axis.”5 Therefore, this article provides a geopolitical analysis of NATO’s China challenge through utilizing classical geopolitical concepts. It argues that NATO allies are best served by concep- tualizing China’s geopolitical challenge through combining ideas provided by British geostrategist Halford Mackinder and American geopolitician Nicholas John Spykman. Understanding Beijing’s rise as a challenge to the Eurasian “rimland” and the “Eurasian maritime periphery” would be key to galvanize a strong NATO response and avoid counterproductive transatlantic tendencies to predominantly perceive China’s rise as a predominantly maritime challenge in the Western Pacific.

### China Impact: Liberal Order—Atrocities Impact

#### Liberal world order is better than a Westphalian system – key to prevent moral atrocities

Walt, ‘21

(Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard, “The World Might Want China’s Rules,” 4 May 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/04/the-world-might-want-chinas-rules/, accessed on 8/3/2021, GDI-ZW)

Given all this, one might think China’s live-and-let-live approach to world order would eventually displace the United States’ liberal ideals, and the normative foundation underlying most global institutions would gradually revert back to a more Westphalian character. I think that conclusion is premature, however, because China’s normative position is not without its own liabilities.

One problem is other states are not indifferent to moral concerns, even in a world where power politics continue to shape much of what they do. Displays of brutality, a callous disregard for the lives of innocent people, and other acts of state-sponsored cruelty are alarming and repellent to others—even when these actions are confined within the borders of a particular state. Even the most despotic regimes understand this tendency, which is why they go to great lengths to conceal such actions, to sanction or restrict those who point it out, and to concoct elaborate excuses to justify crimes that cannot be hidden. The broad (if still shallow) support for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine also suggests many autocracies are uncomfortable with the idea that anything goes within the borders of a particular state.

For this reason, Chinese efforts to promote a world order that legitimates arbitrary rule and where governments’ internal policies are immune from moral censure is bound to make others nervous. When governments insist they have the right to do anything they want within their borders, other states—including other autocracies—will wonder what they might do outside those borders if they are ever in a position to act as they pleased.

Privileging the sovereignty of existing states and their absolute authority within a set of borders also runs counter to the idea of national self-determination. Liberalism emphasizes the rights of individuals, but it has also been sympathetic to the idea that people with a distinct culture, language, and collective identity should be allowed to govern themselves. This ideal helped destroy the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, ended the era of European colonialism, and played no small role in the eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. A world order that facilitates the mistreatment of ethnic or national groups inside a country is not going to appeal to those who either aspire to govern themselves or merely seek a more equal status.

An obvious case in point is China’s heavy-handed efforts to suppress its Uyghur minority and gradually expunge Uyghur cultural identities. If the principles of sovereignty and noninterference are used to defend policies like these, they will lose some of their global appeal, and China’s efforts to chip away at some of the norms that underpin the present global order are likely to be less successful.

### China Impact: Liberal Order—Great Power War Impact

#### Spread of authoritarian nationalism prevents us from stopping global wars and climate catastrophes

Orts, Wharton School professor, ‘18

[Eric Orts, Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,”Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),”, 6—27—18,

<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts>]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: nationalist wars with risks of escalation into global nuclear conflict, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism, and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe.

#### The liberal order stops great power wars—collapse risks competing blocks and undermine collective action needed to address existential risks

Beckley, Tufts University professor, ‘20

[Michael Beckley, Associate Professor, Political Science, Tufts University, “Rogue Superpower: Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 99 n. 6, November / December 2020, Ebsco]

What would happen to the world if the United States fully embraced this kind of “America first” vision? Some analysts paint catastrophic pictures. Robert Kagan foresees a return to the despotism, protectionism, and strife of the 1930s, with China and Russia reprising the roles of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Peter Zeihan predicts a violent scramble for security and resources, in which Russia invades its neighbors and East Asia descends into naval warfare. These forecasts may be extreme, but they reflect an essential truth: the postwar order, although flawed and incomplete in many ways, has fostered the most peaceful and prosperous period in human history, and its absence would make the world a more dangerous place.

Thanks to the U.S.-led order, for decades, most countries have not had to fight for market access, guard their supply chains, or even seriously defend their borders. The U.S. Navy has kept international waterways open, the U.S. market has provided reliable consumer demand and capital for dozens of countries, and U.S. security guarantees have covered nearly 70 nations. Such assurances have benefited everyone: not just Washington’s allies and partners but also its adversaries. U.S. security guarantees had the effect of neutering Germany and Japan, the main regional rivals of Russia and China, respectively. In turn, Moscow and Beijing could focus on forging ties with the rest of the world rather than fighting their historical enemies. Without U.S. patronage and protection, countries would have to get back in the business of securing themselves and their economic lifelines.

Such a world would see the return of great-power mercantilism and new forms of imperialism. Powerful countries would once again try to reduce their economic insecurity by establishing exclusive economic zones, where their firms could enjoy cheap and secure access to raw materials and large captive consumer markets. Today, China is already starting to do this with its Belt and Road Initiative, a network of infrastructure projects around the world; its “Made in China 2025” policy, to stimulate domestic production and consumption; and its attempts to create a closed-off, parallel Internet. If the United States follows suit, other countries will have to attach themselves to an American or a Chinese bloc—or forge blocs of their own. France might seek to restore its grip on its former African colonies. Russia might accelerate its efforts to corral former Soviet states into a regional trade union. Germany increasingly would have to look beyond Europe’s shrinking populations to find buyers for its exports—and it would have to develop the military capacity to secure those new far-flung markets and supply lines, too.

As great powers competed for economic spheres, global governance would erode. Geopolitical conflict would paralyze the UN, as was the case during the Cold War. NATO might dissolve as the United States cherry-picked partners. And the unraveling of the U.S. security blanket over Europe could mean the end of the European Union, too, which already suffers from deep divisions. The few arms control treaties that remain in force today might fall by the wayside as countries militarized to defend themselves. Efforts to combat transnational problems—such as climate change, financial crises, or pandemics—would mimic the world’s shambolic response to COVID-19, when countries hoarded supplies, the World Health Organization parroted Chinese misinformation, and the United States withdrew into itself.

The resulting disorder would jeopardize the very survival of some states. Since 1945, the number of countries in the world has tripled, from 46 to nearly 200. Most of these new states, however, are weak and lack energy, resources, food, domestic markets, advanced technology, military power, or defensible borders. According to research by the political scientist Arjun Chowdhury, two-thirds of all countries today cannot provide basic services to their people without international help. In short, most countries depend critically on the postwar order, which has offered historically unprecedented access to international aid, markets, shipping, and protection. Without such support, some countries would collapse or be conquered. Fragile, aid-dependent states such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Liberia are only some of the most obvious high-risk cases. Less obvious ones are capable but trade-dependent countries such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and South Korea, whose economic systems would struggle to function in a world of closed markets and militarized sea-lanes.

#### The liberal order is the only way to solve multiple existential threats

Harari, Hebrew University History professor, ‘20

[Yuval Noah Harari, Professor, Department of History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Survive the 21st Century: Three Existential Threats to Humanity,” JOURNAL OF DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY v. 3 n. 4, 2020, pp. 463-468, Ingenta]

THE WORLD CUP: AN EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR GLOBAL COOPERATION

The World Cup is a competition between nations, and people often show fierce loyalty to their national team. But at the same time, the World Cup is also an amazing display of global harmony. France cannot play football against Croatia unless the French and the Croatians agree on the same rules for the game. And that is globalism in action.

If you like the World Cup — you are already a globalist.

Now hopefully, nations could agree on global rules not just for football, but also for how to prevent ecological collapse, how to regulate dangerous technologies and how to reduce global inequality. How to make sure, for example, that AI benefits Mexican textile workers and not only American software engineers. Now of course, this is going to be much more difficult than football — but not impossible. Because the impossible, well we have already accomplished the impossible.

We have already escaped the violent jungle in which we humans have lived throughout history. For thousands of years, humans lived under the law of the jungle in a condition of omnipresent war. The law of the jungle said that for every two nearby countries, there is a plausible scenario that they will go to war against each other next year. Under this law, peace meant only ‘the temporary absence of war’.

When there was ‘peace’ between — say — Athens and Sparta, or France and Germany, it meant that now they are not at war, but next year they might be. And for thousands of years, people had assumed that it was impossible to escape this law.

But in the last few decades, humanity has managed to do the impossible, to break the law and to escape the jungle. We have built the rule-based liberal global order that, despite many imperfections, has nevertheless created the most prosperous and most peaceful era in human history.

Peace has changed

‘Peace’ no longer means just the temporary absence of war. Peace now means the implausibility of war.

There are many countries that you simply cannot imagine going to war against each other next year — like France and Germany. There are still wars in some parts of the world. I come from the Middle East, so believe me, I know this perfectly well. But it should not blind us to the overall global picture.

We are now living in a world in which war kills fewer people than suicide, and gunpowder is far less dangerous to your life than sugar. Most countries — with some notable exceptions like Russia — do not even fantasise about conquering and annexing their neighbours. Which is why most countries can afford to spend maybe just about 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence, while spending far, far more on education and healthcare. This is not a jungle.

Unfortunately, we have gotten so used to this wonderful situation that we take it for granted, and we are therefore becoming extremely careless. Instead of doing everything we can to strengthen the fragile global order, countries neglect it and even deliberately undermine it.

The global order is now like a house that everybody inhabits and nobody repairs. It can hold on for a few more years, but if we continue like this, it will collapse — and we will find ourselves back in the jungle of omnipresent war.

We have forgotten what it is like, but believe me as a historian — you do not want to be back there. It is far, far worse than you imagine.

Yes, our species has evolved in that jungle and lived and even prospered there for thousands of years, but if we return there now, with the powerful new technologies of the 21st century, our species will probably annihilate itself.

Of course, even if we disappear, it will not be the end of the world. Something will survive us. Perhaps the rats will eventually take over and rebuild civilisation. Perhaps, then, the rats will learn from our mistakes.

### China Impact: Liberal Order—A2 “China Order Good”

#### No ability to maintain international order by providing public good – lack of will and capacity

Haass and Kupchan 21 (Richard N. President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Charles A. Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The New Concert of Powers: How to Prevent Catastrophe and Promote Stability in a Multipolar World.” In Anchoring the World Edited by Charles A. Kupchan and Leslie Vinjamuri. 3/23/21, Foreign Affairs, Accessed 8/7/21, GDI – JMoore)

Pax Sinica is also a nonstarter. For the foreseeable future, China will have neither the capability nor the ambition to anchor a global order. At least for now, its primary geopolitical ambitions are confined to the Asia-Pacific. China is markedly expanding its commercial reach, in particular through the Belt and Road Initiative, a move that will significantly enhance its economic and political clout. But Beijing has not yet demonstrated a robust willingness to provide global public goods, instead taking a largely mercantilist approach to engagement in most quarters of the globe. Nor has it sought to export its views on domestic governance to others or to push out a new set of norms to anchor global stability. In addition, the United States, even if it continues down a path of strategic retrenchment, will remain a power of the first rank for decades to come. An illiberal and mercantilist Pax Sinica would hardly be acceptable to Americans or to many other peoples around the world still aspiring to uphold liberal principles.

### China Impact: Spheres of Influence

#### Chinese spheres of influence cause global nuke war

Brands and Edel 18, [Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Charles Edel serves as senior fellow and visiting scholar at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and is the author of Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic, The Disharmony of the Spheres, <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/hal-brands/the-disharmony-of-the-spheres/>]

To see this, just work backward from the present. During the Cold War, a bipolar balance did help avert actual war between Moscow and Washington. But even in Europe—where the spheres of influence were best defined—there were continual tensions and crises as Moscow tested the Western bloc. And outside Europe, violence and proxy wars were common as the superpowers competed to extend their reach into the Third World. In the 1930s, the emergence of German and Japanese spheres of influence led to the most catastrophic war in global history. The empires of the 19th century—spheres of influence in their own right—continually jostled one another, leading to wars and near-wars over the course of decades; the Peace of Amiens between England and Napoleonic France lasted a mere 14 months. And looking back to the ancient world, there were not one, but three Punic Wars fought between Rome and Carthage as two expanding empires came into conflict. A world defined by spheres of influence is often a world characterized by tensions, wars, and competition.

The reasons for this are simple. As the political scientist William Wohlforth observed, unipolar systems—such as the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War order—are anchored by a hegemonic power that can act decisively to maintain the peace. In a unipolar system, Wohlforth writes, there are few incentives for revisionist powers to incur the “focused enmity” of the leading state. Truly multipolar systems, by contrast, have often been volatile. When the major powers are more evenly matched, there is a greater temptation to aggression by those who seek to change the existing order of things. And seek to change things they undoubtedly will.

The idea that spheres of influence are stabilizing holds only if one assumes that the major powers are motivated only by insecurity and that concessions to the revisionists will therefore lead to peace. Churchill described this as the idea that if one “feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last.”

Unfortunately, today’s rising or resurgent powers are also motivated—as is America—by honor, ambition, and the timeless desire to make their international habitats reflect their own interests and ideals. It is a risky gamble indeed, then, to think that ceding Russia or China an uncontested sphere of influence would turn a revisionist authoritarian regime into a satisfied power. The result, as Robert Kagan has noted, might be to embolden those actors all the more, by giving them freer rein to bring their near-abroads under control, greater latitude and resources to pursue their ambitions, and enhanced confidence that the U.S.-led order is fracturing at its foundations. For China, dominance over the first island chain might simply intensify desires to achieve primacy in the second island chain and beyond; for Russia, renewed mastery in the former Soviet space could lead to desires to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel, as well. To observe how China is developing ever longer-range anti-access/area denial capabilities, or how Russia has been projecting military power ever farther afield, is to see this process in action.

The reemergence of a spheres-of-influence world would thus undercut one of the great historical achievements of U.S. foreign policy: the creation of a system in which America is the dominant power in each major geopolitical region and can act decisively to shape events and protect its interests. It would foster an environment in which democratic values are less prominent, authoritarian models are ascendant, and mercantilism advances as economic openness recedes. And rather than leading to multipolar stability, this change could simply encourage greater revisionism on the part of powers whose appetite grows with the eating. This would lead the world away from the relative stability of the post–Cold War era and back into the darker environment it seemed to have relegated to history a quarter-century ago. The phrase “spheres of influence” may sound vaguely theoretical and benign, but its real-world effects are likely to be tangible and pernicious.

Fortunately, the return of a spheres-of-influence world is not yet inevitable. Even as some nations will accept incorporation into a Chinese or Russian sphere of influence as the price of avoiding conflict, or maintaining access to critical markets and resources, others will resist because they see their own well-being as dependent on the preservation of the world order that Washington has long worked to create. The Philippines and Cambodia seem increasingly to fall into the former group; Poland and Japan, among many others, make up the latter. The willingness of even this latter group to take actions that risk incurring Beijing and Moscow’s wrath, however, will be constantly calibrated against an assessment of America’s own ability to continue leading the resistance to a spheres-of-influence world. Averting that outcome is becoming steadily harder, as the relative power and ambition of America’s authoritarian rivals rise and U.S. leadership seems to falter.

### China Impact: U.S. Hegemony

#### China seeks expanded sphere of influence into Europe to enable global power projection to reduce US power

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

\*figures omitted

Geopolitical blueprint: China as NATO’s “Eurasian Maritime Periphery” challenge

How can the geopolitical ideas of Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan help understand NATO’s China challenge? The following sets out a case for the United States and its European allies to perceive China as a major hegemonic challenger on the “Eurasian Maritime Periphery.”

In their in-depth study on China’s geopolitical ambition and geostrategic challenges, Toshi Yoshihara and Jack Bianchi have highlighted that as part of China’s global power ambitions, the projection of sustainable naval power includes strategic Euro-Atlantic waterways such as the Artic and the Mediterranean, as well as the adjacent geographic areas. They also note Beijing’s strategy to making inroads into Europe through the Indian Ocean.35 In this context, Martin Mitchell has argued that a combination of Mackinder’s and Spykman’s implies a necessity for America to understand that China has emerged as America’s key competitor in the “Eurasian Maritime Periphery,” where Beijing seeks to establish spheres of influence.36 This geographical space is depicted in Figure 1.

While Mitchell’s article focusses on the Indo-Pacific dimension in a U.S. strategy to contest China’s control of the Eurasian maritime periphery, this article applies this geopolitical framework on the case of NATO. The Eurasian Maritime Periphery encom- passes maritime Europe and its rimland; and understanding that China’s geopolitical challenge directly affects Euro-Atlantic geography and security is critical for NATO allies in mustering a collective response.

Far from only posing a challenge to U.S. and allied interests in the Western Pacific, China seeks to establish itself as the major power on the Eurasian landmass as part of its broader global aspirations. Tellingly, Mackinder’s ideas appear to at least partly drive China’s behavior in this regard. For instance, Chinese analysts concluded that China needed “Mackinder’s heartland to reduce the enormous strategic pressure from the eastern Pacific” and that China’s grand strategy had the potential to “be fulfilled on the Eurasian continent.”37 Moreover, Beijing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) is an expression of China’s quest to expand its strategic influence on the Eurasian landmass toward the west through an integrated and interconnected Eurasian continent. It is a key piece for China’s strategy to gain regional predominance in Asia in the context of its strategic competition with the United States.38 Consequently, China increasingly perceives the Eurasian landmass “knitted into one large geopolitical playing field and the seas around it as a Eurasian maritime ring road.”39 Geostrategically, the BRI might well reflect the ancient Chinese game of go, that is, a “strategy that a player might adopt in a long game to surround or neutralize an opponent’s more exposed or isolated pieces before gathering forces for an assault on the main stronghold.”40 Such a Chinese strategy would center on the objective to gradually establish a Sinocentric regional order across the Eurasian continent to further minimize U.S. and Western influence.41 However, the continental dimension is only one part of China’s ambition to project global power. Indeed, China is increasingly relying on sea power to projecting military power into the Middle East, Africa and Europe, not least owing to the geographic difficulties of projecting such force across the vast Eurasian landmass.42 Elements of the BRI in the Eurasian maritime periphery such as the aforementioned Chinese port investments in Greece thus serve to expanding China’s future maritime footprint in the Euro-Atlantic security area.43 This creates long-term challenges to Europe’s maritime security and control of key waterways, and could directly complicate NATO’s military mobility in the future.44

### China Impact: A2 “China Not Revisionist”

#### Chinese revisionism with growing aggregate power threatens Europe and US

Schreer, 2022

[Benjamin, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, macquarie University, Sydney, australia “A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge”, Comparative Strategy, 41:2, 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2022.2039013 accessed TANF online – UT 6.16.2022 GDI-TM]

Classical geopolitics, NATO and China’s rise Just as geography has an enduring impact on nation’s strategy,6 geopolitics continues to influence power relationships and international relations. Geopolitics is concerned with “the impact or influence of certain geographic features, positions and locations of regions, states, and resources, plus topography, climate, distance, states’ size and shape, demography, and the like, upon states’ foreign policies and actions as an aid to statecraft.”7 It provides the crucial “context for understanding the behavior of states pursuant to their establishment and control of: (a) boundaries, (b) strategically import- ant areas, and (c) sea routes and land corridors.”8 Moreover, it directly influences the global and regional balance of power since it “affects the interests of the powers, thus influencing conflict over vital interests.”9 Importantly, classical geopolitics has retained its solvency for statecraft and theory, as well as for examining the enduring causes of geography for conflict and peace.10 In fact, China’s rise has led to a renaissance of classical geopolitics in the strategic debate.11 Moreover, for policymakers and practitioners, classical geopolitics has never lost its attraction.12 This is also evident in the current NATO debate about China. For instance, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg not only observed that China was “fundamentally shifting the global balance of power” but also observed that the “geog- raphy of danger” was shifting as a result: They are investing heavily in modern military capabilities, including missiles that can reach all NATO allied countries. They’re coming closer to us in cyberspace. We see them in the Arctic, in Africa. We see them investing in our critical infrastructure. And they are working more and more together with Russia. All of this has security consequences for NATO Allies.13 Moreover, an expert group appointed by the Secretary General assessing NATO’s future concluded in December 2020 that the “growing power and assertiveness of China is the other major geopolitical development that is changing the strategic cal- culus of the Alliance.”14 Moreover, France’s President Emmanuel Macron declared in March 2019 that Europe’s future approach to China had to be based on “a geopolitical and strategic relationship.”15 Put simply, NATO allies can no longer avoid dealing with China’s geopolitical chal- lenge. Not only has it become clear that Beijing is a revisionist major power, dissatisfied with the status quo.16 Moreover, its aggregate power is growing, with long-term strategic implications for the Euro-Atlantic area. For instance, in 2020 China’s defense expen- diture exceeded those of European countries combined.17 In addition, China has invested significantly in critical European port infrastructure. In fact, in 2018 Chinese state-controlled companies controlled about ten percent of European port facilities, specifically through acquisitions in Spain, Italy and Greece. As well, Sino-Russian strategic relations under Presidents Xi and Vladimir Putin moved beyond mere “con- venience” and are now grounded in the mutual objective to erode the U.S.-led Western order and to expand their respective spheres of influence.18 As a result, NATO allies have paid much closer attention to the potential implications of Sino-Russian strategic activities for the Euro-Atlantic area.19

### China Impact: A2 “War Risk Low”

#### Conflict risks are high—many drivers

Lyons, Belfer Center fellow ‘22

[Marco Lyons, National Security Fellow 2022, Belfer Center, “China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications,” POLICY BRIEF, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 1—14—22, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/chinas-rise-and-us-defense-implications>, accessed 6-12-22]

There may be circumstances and options for major powers to control their ambitions and cooperate for stability and peaceful development, but the drivers for conflict point to even more intense competitive rivalry. Significant drivers for war include: diminishing arms control; weakening international institutions; persistent competition between democracies and autocratic states; increasing nationalism; advancements in long-range strike, and in nontraditional ways of warfare; and a possible explosion in mis- and disinformation.19 U.S. China scholars and policy experts have been starting to refer to decisive turning points in Washington-Beijing relations, such as the March 2021 meeting in Alaska between senior officials, and this may reflect a growing sense that the stakes involved are significantly higher than in any recent period.20 China will continue working for a dominant regional position, as a major power may be expected to do, but it is also maneuvering for global power, and these advances to the global stage may surprise American strategists if Beijing does not follow expected paths.21 While power shifts alone should not spell future armed conflict, the U.S.-China rivalry has multiple dimensions, including technological, security-defense, and ideological, and that suggests that the drivers for conflict will be hard to manage for both sides.

#### China is a revisionist power—any war will escalate

Beckley, Tufts professor and Brands, Johns Hopkins professor, ‘21

[Michael Beckley, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Associate Professor, Tufts University and Hal Brands, Senior Fellow, American Enterpreise Institute and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “What Will Drive China to War?” THE ATLANTIC, 11—1—21, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/us-china-war/620571/>, accessed 6-12-22]

Beijing is a remarkably ambitious revanchist power, one determined to make China whole again by “reuniting” Taiwan with the mainland, turning the East and South China Seas into Chinese lakes, and grabbing regional primacy as a stepping-stone to global power. It is also increasingly encircled, and faces growing resistance on many fronts—just the sort of scenario that has led it to lash out in the past.

The historical record since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 is clear: When confronted by a mounting threat to its geopolitical interests, Beijing does not wait to be attacked; it shoots first to gain the advantage of surprise.

In conflicts including the Korean War and clashes with Vietnam in 1979, China has often viewed the use of force as an educational exercise. It is willing to pick even a very costly fight with a single enemy to teach it, and others observing from the sidelines, a lesson.

Today, Beijing might be tempted to engage in this sort of aggression in multiple areas. And once the shooting starts, the pressures for escalation are likely to be severe.

# Impact: Russia

### Russia Internal: Deterrence

#### Territorial defense key to deterrence by denial – solves Ukraine escalation

Deni, 2022

[John R. research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, “NATO’s New (Old) Mission: Territorial Defense” Carnegie Europe March 22, 2022 [https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689 accessed 6.17.2022](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86689%20accessed%206.17.2022) GDI-TM]

As NATO places a priority on the collective defense threat from Russia, it should also move toward a posture of deterrence by denial across Eastern Europe.

This type of deterrence differs from what the alliance has primarily emphasized in recent decades—namely, deterrence by punishment. Under the latter, the alliance deters Russia by clearly indicating it will strike back in devastating fashion if Russia initiates aggression. NATO accomplishes this by stationing its multinational battlegroups across the Baltic states and Poland. These units are small and cannot hold off a large-scale Russian invasion, but they include troops from across the alliance, meaning that Russia would be taking on nearly all of NATO if it attacked into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland.

Under deterrence by denial, NATO’s posture in the East would need to be beefed up both qualitatively—to counter specific Russian offensive capabilities such as its artillery and rockets—and quantitively—to meet the scale of the Russian threat. The goal would be for NATO to stop and repel an attempted attack into allied territory, not merely respond to one after the fact.

This sounds appealing—especially if you live in Lithuania, for example—but it means the alliance will most likely need to return in some measure to larger scale territorial defense through so-called “in-place forces.” This doesn’t mean NATO needs to match Russian forces soldier-for-soldier or tank-for-tank, but it probably would mean a return to some level of conscription among more European allies, to keep costs relatively low while generating the necessary force levels.

The extraordinary summit this week provides the alliance an opportunity to further refine and strengthen its response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine as well as Belarus. By privileging the collective defense mission, at least temporarily shelving its 360-degree approach, and doubling down on territorial defense capabilities, NATO can go far in ensuring the war doesn’t expand.

### Russia Internal: Russia Focus / Territorial Defense

#### Collective defense focus is the core of NATO—U.S. needs to promote it as the primary mission

Coffey & Kochis, Heritage Foundation analysts, ‘20

[Luke Coffee, Heritage Foundation institute director and Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst, Davis Institute, Heritage Foundation, “NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” SPECIAL REPORT n. 235, 8—10—20, p. 9]

NATO was founded in 1949 with the mission of protecting the territorial integrity of its members and—if required—defeating the Soviet Union. While NATO’s members are no longer worried about the spread of Communism, many current NATO members are certainly worried about protecting their territory from Russian aggression.

The United States should work to ensure that NATO’s collective defense mission and the threat from Russia are the main focus of the Alliance. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to Russia.

NATO must be able to deter aggression and defend the territorial integrity of its members. Everything else that NATO might do is secondary to the No. 1 mission of collective territorial defense. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Any deviation from this commitment will only invite aggression. This mutual defense clause is what makes Article 5 the cornerstone of the Alliance. Everything that NATO does stems from this critical point.

#### NATO burden sharing means increased troop commitments to deter Russia

Keil, Senior Fellow, Security and Defense Policy GMF, 2022

[Steven, German Marshall Fund - non-partisan policy organization studying transatlantic interests “NATO Core Tasks in a Contested Global Landscape” German Marshall Fund February 11, 2022 [https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape GDI-TM 6.16.2022](https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-core-tasks-contested-global-landscape%20GDI-TM%206.16.2022)]

A European Security and Defense Ambition

The shift in the United States’ policy does not mean it will abandon Europe or the strategic umbrella—including the NATO nuclear-sharing agreement—which is a foundation of its commitment to the continent. But as former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategy and co-lead for the 2018 National Defense Strategy Elbridge Colby asserted in thinking through a new transatlantic bargain, “the lion’s share of the forces required to deter or defeat a Russian attack on NATO would, however, be provided by European nations.” Colby argues that this would only require a modest increase and adjustment in the type of conventional capabilities required to deter Russia, but explicitly notes that “a dollar spent or soldier stationed in Europe will be one not spent or stationed in Asia. This means Europeans will need to pick up a considerably greater share of the burden.”1414Ibid.

While Europe has made significant investments since 2014, its side of the burden-sharing equation is still insufficient. More funding and political will is required to close the gap. High-demand capabilities like strategic lift and mission-enabling assets like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are still badly needed, not to mention more core conventional capabilities associated with territorial defense. The United States has been forced to step in on multiple occasions to provide logistical and intelligence assistance for European forces in places like Libya and Mali. In some cases, there has simply been a lack of adequate munition stockpiles in Europe. Overcoming these deficiencies will be critical to creating an augmented level of European deterrence and an increased European ambition.

### Russia Impact: Deterrence

#### Deterrence key to check escalation—especially true given Russia’s weakness

Economist ‘22

[staff, “How Rotten Is Russia’s Army?” THE ECONOMIST, 4—30—22, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/04/30/how-rotten-is-russias-army>, accessed 5-9-22]

Ultimately, weakness may lead Russia to the last arena where it is still indisputably a superpower: chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. From the start of this war, Mr Putin and his government have repeatedly brandished the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Mr Putin is rational, in that he wants his regime to survive, so the chances of their use probably remain slim. But as Russia’s armed forces run out of conventional options, the temptation to escalate will surely grow.

The message for the wider world is that Mr Putin’s military opportunism in Ukraine must be seen to fail by his own officers and strategists, who may then temper his next headstrong scheme. A stalemate in Donbas would merely set up the next fight and it could be even more threatening than today’s.

Yet, even if Mr Putin is defeated, he will remain dangerous. The message for nato is that it needs to update its tripwire defence. This rests on the idea that a Russian attempt to take a bite out of, say, the Baltic states may succeed at first, but would trigger a wider war which nato would eventually win. That defence involves the risk of miscalculation and escalation, which are more fraught than ever if Russia’s conventional forces are weak. Better to have a large forward force that Russia would find hard to defeat from the very start. The best way to be safe from Mr Putin and his rotten army is to deter him from fighting at all.